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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The bosom of America is open to receive not only the Opulent and respected Stranger, but the 
oppressed and persecuted of all Nations and Religions; whom we shall welcome to a 
participation of all our rights and privileges, if by decency and propriety of conduct they appear 
to merit the enjoyment.  
– George Washington, Letter of General George Washington on America as Asylum, New York, 
December 2, 1783. 1  
 
The quote above, written by the first president of the United States, provides excellent 
foreshadow for presidential immigration rhetoric and the conditional nature of public 
immigration sentiment for the centuries that followed its formation. This thesis explores 
presidential immigration rhetoric and its consequences using two presidential case studies from 
the 1980s and 1990s, and explores the first rhetorical responses to the most recent wave of 
immigration to the United States. Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton are the subjects of this project 
due to their oppositional political ideologies. Further, the immigration legislation passed during 
the two decades in which they served as presidents can be characterized as oppositional in 
effectiveness, despite stated similar goals of the legislation. Reagan was a conservative, pro-
business Republican, while Clinton was a more liberal (though still relatively moderate neo-
liberal) president who favored globalization policies. Immigration legislation passed during 
Reagan’s presidency was expansive in admittance policy, whereas restrictive immigration policy 
was implemented during Clinton’s administration and the U.S.-Mexico border was tightened. 
Immigration policy was viewed as unsuccessful under both presidents, but examining the ways 
in which Reagan and Clinton spoke about immigration can lead to greater understanding of how 
rhetoric contributed to public sentiment and interpretation of legislative action.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. Michael Lemay and Elliott Robert Barkan, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Laws 
and Issues: A Documentary History, (Greenwood Press, 1999).  
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 The late 1970s and early 1980s marked the beginning of the fourth and current wave of 
immigration to the United States, which meant needs and perceptions of newcomers shifted on 
the basis of an influx of immigrants and their changing demographics. The end of the Bracero 
program and the implementation of the 1965 Immigration Act are often credited with causing 
this influx, of both documented and undocumented immigrants. U.S. immigration laws generally 
favored Anglo-European immigrants, but became non-discriminatory by definition in 1965, 
when quotas were removed from the legislation. Until 1965, various groups were excluded on 
the basis of nationality, and sometimes this exclusion was justified using racist language, 
exacerbated by the manipulation of social science and the eugenics movement in the early 1900s. 
The Asiatic Barred Zone excluded all Asians from the U.S. in 1917, and in 1924 the National 
Origins Act called for 82% of immigrants to the U.S. to be of northern or western European 
origin. “Operation Wetback” in the 1950s was the first time that immigrants from Latin America 
were explicitly deported. Current legislation is not so explicit, but the ways in which rhetoric 
surrounding policy implies racist overtones on the basis of assimilating to “American” culture 
and attributes specific characteristics to immigrants is important and pointed.  
This thesis focuses on rhetoric, which is language employed for persuasive purposes. The 
specific immigration discourses to which presidential immigration rhetoric contributes are also 
crucial for discussion of the function of the rhetoric during the two administrations in question. 
Discourse is essentially the existence of terms, rhetoric, and discussions that are heard and 
compiled into an understanding of a theme, particularly understood by insiders of communities 
where discussion of the particular theme exists. Discourse is the way that issues are discussed 
thematically, and repeated rhetoric is used to contribute to discourses on particular topics. In 
discussion of the analysis of discourse in her book, Making Sense of Public Opinion: American 
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Discourses about Immigration and Social Programs, Claudia Strauss writes, “Conventional-
discourse analysis assumes that people encounter political messages from many sources. From 
each source people acquire not an overall ideology but something narrower in scope, a common 
way of talking and thinking about one aspect of a topic. Each of these familiar points and its 
associated rhetoric is a conventional discourse.”2 Discourses are a framework through which 
common phrases and ways of speaking are reiterated. Strauss continues, “Even if there is only a 
one-way communication from a single speaker to an audience, ideas are stated, often using the 
somewhat standardized rhetoric of conventional discourses.”3 Because standardized rhetoric only 
needs to come from one speaker to an audience, conventional discourse analysis can be applied 
to presidential rhetoric. Strauss writes, “Conventional-discourse analysis is also useful for 
studying the rhetoric of elites. It is common for politicians to juxtapose conventional discourses 
from different sides of an issue.”4 The suggested saliency of discourses, specifically 
conventional-discourses, means that rhetoric that contributes to discourse is meaningful for 
shaping the way political topics are spoken about and understood on various levels and by 
various constituencies. 
Scholarship on presidential rhetoric sheds light on the saliency of discourses and the way 
rhetoric aids political agendas. Scholars point to the symbolic role that the president of the 
United States invariably plays. The position, steeped in historic symbolism, allows for a unique 
pedestal from which those who hold it can contribute to discourses. Michael Novak posits that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2. Claudia Strauss, Making Sense of Public Opinion: American Discourses about 
Immigration and Social Programs, (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 5.  
 
3. Strauss, Making Sense of Public Opinion, 15.  
 
4. Ibid., 14.  
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the president commands more power and significance in their speech than other governmental 
actors, like the speaker of the house or the senate leader.5 Novak writes, “In an analogous way, 
when the president of the United States walks into a room, not only power but also memory 
enters with him.”6 The president signifies not only current power of the U.S., but represents 
presidents of the past as well. In addition to representing history and the aspirations of the nation, 
Novak argues, symbolic presidential power comes from being elected legally and by popular 
vote, as a theoretical tribune of all of the people of the United States. Using Clinton as an 
example, Novak writes,  
The presidency gave Clinton great symbolic power to polarize judgments nationwide – 
for him or against him – compared to any power he would have had, say, as a law 
professor in Little Rock or even as a governor of Arkansas. What he said and did as 
president not only rubbed off on the country but it has been ineluctably added to the 
associations that the White House from now on will always have. It has altered the image 
that Americans now have of the nation.7 
Longevity of the rhetorical input of presidents after their administrations are no longer in office 
points to further saliency of the messages they promote while there.  
Because the president holds symbolic power, it means that their rhetoric also carries a 
certain weight in its influence on audiences. Jeffrey E. Cohen conducted a study of presidential 
State of the Union addresses to test the hypothesis that the more attention that is paid by a 
president to a particular policy issue in their State of the Union address, the more public concern 
for that policy grows. The State of the Union address reaches a large number of people and is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5. Michael Novak, “President of All the People,” in Who Belongs in America? 
Presidents, Rhetoric, and Immigration, edited by Vanessa B. Beasley, 19-36. (College Station: 
Texas A&M University Press, 2006).  
 
6. Ibid.,19.  
 
7. Ibid., 23. 
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consistent speech across presidencies, which made it useful for Cohen’s study. Results showed 
that the public had an increased attention to policies that presidents mentioned in their State of 
the Union addresses. Presidents were not shown to have to use substantive arguments, and could 
sway public opinion simply by mentioning policies, though substantive arguments and an 
explanation of reasoning for a certain position aided in public attentiveness and understanding of 
that policy. This outcome was the case particularly for members of the mass public who are not 
relatively politically inclined. Cohen emphasizes the invariability of the role of the president, 
irrespective of individual factors and characterizations they bring to the office. Cohen writes, in 
concurrence with Novak, “No other politician or office is accorded such a role; none can 
compete effectively with the president in terms of prestige, status, media access, public attention 
and interest.”8 The wide-reaching impact of the president is consistent, even if only symbolic, 
though the particular type of impact and method contributing to impact has changed over time.  
Suggested instrumental changes in public persona of presidents are documented in 
scholarship. Theodore Roosevelt is considered the first president who embodied the “modern” 
presidency, and Elvin T. Lim explains that the “data powerfully support the general claim that a 
significant transformation of presidential rhetoric occurred in the early decades of the twentieth 
century.”9 Lim argues that “modern presidents” are rhetorically very different from their 
predecessors. He writes that scholars who study presidential rhetoric under varying schools of 
thought “observe a significant transformation of the presidency… from a traditional, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8. Jeffrey E. Cohen. “Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda,” in American Journal 
of Political Science 39, no. 1 (1995): 89.  
 
9. Elvin T. Lim, Center for the Study of the Presidency, “Five Trends in Presidential 
Rhetoric: An Analysis of Rhetoric from George Washington to Bill Clinton,” in Presidential 
Studies Quarterly 32, no. 2 (2002): 332.  
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administrative, and unrhetorical office into a modern, expansive, and stridently rhetorical one in 
which incumbents routinely speak over the head of Congress and to the public to lead and to 
govern.”10 Lim describes five hallmarks of the modern president’s rhetoric: the anti-
intellectualization of rhetoric, the rise of abstract rhetoric, assertive rhetoric, democratic rhetoric, 
and conversational and anecdotal rhetoric. Some pre-modern presidents exhibit one or more of 
those characterizations, but they are ultimately exceptions that “prove the rule” that the 
“modern” president is increasingly rhetorical in their symbolic position.  
By anti-intellectualization, Lim refers to the informality in modern rhetoric and the 
decrease in reflection of cognitive reasoning to reach conclusions. In addition to anti-
intellectualization, abstract rhetoric, characterized by expansion and loftiness, has risen with the 
modern presidency. Lim writes, “As rhetoricians through the ages have realized, abstract rhetoric 
has great political value.”11 Abstractness of rhetoric has magnified even from the founding 
rhetorical terms “life,” “liberty,” and “the pursuit of happiness.” In description of assertive 
rhetoric, Lim explains, “[modern presidential rhetoric] has become activist, ‘realist,’ and 
confident.”12 According to Lim, assertiveness implies a strengthened executive branch, increased 
presidential power (symbolically) and a consequent lack of humility in the president as orator. 
Significantly, Lim explains the argument that modern presidential rhetoric is increasingly 
democratic: “Presidential rhetoric has become more people-oriented in the past century and 
especially in the past three decades.”13 This rhetoric brings compassion, inclusivity, familial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10. Ibid., 328-29.  
 
11. Ibid., 334.  
 
12. Ibid., 335.  
 
13. Ibid., 338.  
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values, and egalitarianism to presidential rhetoric on the basis of universal values of equality that 
are inherent to democracy and thus inherent to the United States. A rise in conversational, 
anecdotal rhetoric that describes the experience of the American people is arguably employed to 
offer a trusting closeness to audiences receiving modern presidential rhetoric. Increases in 
rhetorical strategies characterize the modern president and imply that rhetoric employed by 
Reagan and Clinton can be characterized through those hallmarks.  
With a documented rise in specific rhetorical strategies from modern presidents, 
including Reagan and Clinton, the audience to which presidents address their rhetoric becomes 
pertinent.  Three main concerns in the formation of presidential rhetoric include “those which 
relate to the pragmatic politics of the day, those which emanate from the institutional constraints 
of their office, and those which invoke the larger and more abstract symbolic themes of mythos 
of U.S. nationalism.”14 Constraints may be considered in conjunction with attention to audience, 
and shifting levels of concern of an audience’s reception. A distinction exists between speaking 
to “the people” and speaking to state and national legislators. Presidents also mobilize voters to 
elect and pressure legislators who will pass specific legislation. Mobilizing voters is especially 
useful for making legislative change when Congress is politically polarized. Lim’s suggestion of 
an evidenced rise in democratic presidential rhetoric that is also more conversational, colloquial, 
and anti-intellectual implies language use that is increasingly geared toward the mass public. The 
rise of the “modern” president means that their audience has increasingly become “the people.” 
If the mass public has increasingly become the target of the modern president’s rhetoric, 
public opinion analysis can gauge the function and perceived success of that rhetoric. Marrero 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
14. Vanessa Beasley, Who Belongs in America? Presidents, Rhetoric, and Immigration, 
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2006), 5.  
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discusses presidential immigration rhetoric of modern presidents and asks, “Why do the 
prevailing dialogue and hard-line policies continue, when public opinion is actually much more 
rational than what is reflected in the news?”15 Marrero suggests disconnects between dialogues 
surrounding immigration and the public’s reception of specific dialogues, particularly the 
misconception that the public cannot understand more nuanced arguments. Masuoka and Junn 
also discuss how political elites and their communication influences public opinion on 
immigration. The two use the racial hierarchy theory to argue that one’s race is one of the 
primary determinants of their opinion on immigration issues and their reception of rhetoric on 
immigration. 16  Ultimately, they argue that racial undertones are clearly present in immigration 
policy and discussion, and that is why using the theory of racial hierarchy in order to determine 
how various groups respond to immigration policy and discussion is crucial.17 Additionally, to 
show that elite rhetoric is not the only communication contributing to discourses surrounding 
immigration, Masuoka and Junn argue that while politicians can align immigration topics within 
certain frameworks through their messages to the public, immigration activists and advocates can 
make similar alignments, emphasizing different values like fairness and opportunity, rather than 
negative values like danger to national security.18 While the thesis project at hand looks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15. Pilar Marrero. Killing the American Dream: How Anti-Immigration Extremists are 
Destroying the Nation, Palgrave MacMillan, 2012, 211.  
 
16. Racial hierarchy theory is the widely accepted concept that a racial hierarchy exists in 
the social structure of the United States, and it historically gives unwarranted privilege and 
advantage to white people, while disadvantaging people of color. The hierarchy is perpetuated 
through stereotypes and an underlying understanding of the operation of the hierarchy in the 
U.S., even if it s not explicitly stated as reason for biased action (i.e. aversive racism).  
 
17. Natalie Masuoka and Jane Junn, The Politics of Belonging: Race, Public Opinion, 
and Immigration, (The University of Chicago Press, 2013). 
 
18. Ibid., 157-58.  
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specifically at presidential rhetoric from two “modern” presidents, it is important to note that 
other sources of rhetoric contribute to immigration discourses and public opinion of issues on the 
basis of rhetoric, and presidential power is certainly not the only force at work in the national 
immigration conversation.  
Presidential immigration rhetoric, however, aligns with characterizations of the “modern” 
president’s rhetoric: the anti-intellectualization of rhetoric, abstract rhetoric, assertive rhetoric, 
democratic rhetoric, and conversationally anecdotal rhetoric. Beasley asserts that immigrants are 
spoken about either as symbols of hope and opportunity, or as dangerous threats to economic 
stability and national security. Opposing representations of immigrants in rhetoric are pervasive, 
and a study by Damien Arthur and Joshua Woods draws attention to many factors that influence 
presidential immigration rhetoric and its formation within the bounds of these opposing symbolic 
characterizations. Their study, “The Contextual Presidency: The Negative Shift in Presidential 
Immigration Rhetoric,” coded for negative immigration frameworks in speeches made by 
Presidents Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama. Primary negative frameworks for which they 
coded were frameworks of illegality, criminality, terrorism, or threats to economic stability. The 
study ultimately asks eight research questions in order to determine how context plays a role in 
presidential immigration rhetoric. The independent variables Arthur and Woods studied were 
whether there was an election transpiring (and whether that was a midterm or presidential 
election), whether the speech was made before or after 9/11, who the audience was, whether 
branches of the government were politically divided or in unison, who had control of the 
chamber, approval rating of the president the day before their speech, the type of speech the 
president gave (whether it was a news conference, a town hall meeting, a major speech, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
Slauson 13 
interview, remarks, or another form), whether or not the nation was in a recession, the inflation 
rate, GDP, social identifiers of the immigrants about whom they were speaking, geographical 
area where the speech was given, whether or not they mentioned reforming the immigration 
process, and whether or not the speech was given in a border state or not.19 Independent variables 
used in this study are considered in analysis of Reagan and Clinton’s rhetoric in this thesis, along 
with frameworks developed on the basis of conventional immigration discourses.  
Strauss provides multiple national discourses surrounding immigration in her book, and 
presidential immigration rhetoric readily contributes to the frameworks she describes. While a 
large number of discourses exist, I will focus on four main discourses and their sub-discourses 
for the purpose of analyzing rhetoric in this thesis. The first is the “nation of immigrants” 
discourse. Strauss writes, “The basic schema conveyed by [the Nation of Immigrants] discourse 
is that, except for American Indians, everyone in the United States is either an immigrant or a 
descendant of one. Immigrants and their descendants have made this country what it is today, so 
of course immigration has benefited the country.”20 Asserting people in the U.S. should not be 
opposed to immigration in principle, the “nation of immigrants” discourse frames discussions 
about immigration as important to the nation, but separates current immigration events from the 
immigration of the past as a distinct nation-forming phenomenon that is no longer relevant 
because the U.S. is now a unified “melting pot.” Discussions about cultural diversity as a guiding 
and enriching principle, as well as allusions to humanitarian efforts to help immigrants 
(especially children) maintain human rights, fall under the discourse of the “nation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19. Damien Arthur and Joshua Woods, “The Contextual Presidency: The Negative Shift 
in Presidential Immigration Rhetoric,” in Presidential Studies Quarterly 43, no. 3 (2013): 475.  
 
20. Strauss, Making Sense of Public Opinion, 24.  
 
Slauson 14 
immigrants.” Marrero reiterates the operation of this discourse: “Generally, the ‘good’ ones are 
the people already here, who came before now (whenever ‘now’ is); and the ‘bad’ are the people 
just arriving now or who will in the future.”21 This discourse is harmful because it trivializes the 
current immigration experience and stratifies immigrant communities. 
The next discourse and its sub-discourses stem from the perceived impacts immigrants 
have on the U.S. economy. Economic discourses are framed using examples of the positive 
contributions immigrants make to the U.S. economy through their labor, or the negative threat to 
resources immigrants pose. Positive economic immigration discourses include the “free market” 
discourse: there should not be forces interfering with the market; guest worker programs are 
positive because they ensure high labor supply and competition among laborers. Primary 
language used to express free-market discourse points to flexible labor markets, profits, and 
supply. Another positive discourse Strauss outlines refers to immigrant work ethic. It is formed 
based on language asserting that immigrants work hard (often harder than U.S.-born Americans), 
and their hard work should be respected and rewarded. Specific language used in contributions to 
this discourse includes statements about hard work, effort, drive, and the desire for a better life.22 
Framing immigrants as hard-working laborers means exploitations of their labor under the 
discourse of the “free market” can be more readily justified.  
 Negatively based economic discourses include the assertion that there are “too many 
immigrants” in the U.S., with language referring to limited resources, the environmental impact 
of overpopulation, economic, legal and cultural concerns, the “broken border,” invasions, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21. Marrero, Killing the American Dream, 204. 
  
22. Strauss, Making Sense of Public Opinion, 52. 
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“floods” of immigrants.23 Another is the “benefits for contributors” discourse, which asserts that 
only people who make an economic contribution through labor or taxes should receive 
government benefits. It operates either under the untrue assumption that undocumented 
immigrants do not pay taxes and consequently should not receive benefits, or under the 
assumption that immigrants contribute to the economy regardless of their documentation, and 
consequently are entitled to taxpayer-funded benefits.24 The “benefits for contributors” discourse 
is problematic due to the subjective nature with which someone might be deemed a 
“contributor.” Most of the discourse claiming immigrants are not contributors assumes that it is 
undocumented immigrants reaping benefits from the government they do not deserve. The bias 
attributed to undocumented immigrants can be explained by the weight placed on legality and 
illegality, discussed in the next main discourse.  
 Generally speaking, there is a hyper-focus on terms of “legality” when describing the 
immigrant experience, even when the experience is not so narrow. In general, immigration is 
understood and discussed under terms of “legality.” The primary discourse in this realm states 
“being illegal is wrong.” Language about the border, enforcement of the law, the term “illegal” 
applied to immigrants, references to breaking the law, the U.S. as a nation of laws, and amnesty 
as a negative term fall under “illegal is wrong” discourse. It asserts that documented immigrants 
are welcome in the United States, while undocumented immigrants are not.25 An extension of 
rhetoric encouraging an enforced border focuses on national security, stressing language about 
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keeping “criminals” and “terrorists” out of the country through border control.26 By categorizing 
immigrants under strict categories of “legal” and “illegal,” this discourse removes the human 
dimension from the immigrant experience and implies that documentation or lack thereof is the 
most important way to describe a person who was not born in the United States. Marrero writes, 
“the whole concept of illegality has become the biggest stumbling block to a rational dialogue on 
immigration.”27 Isolating the discussion of immigration to language of legality prohibits 
meaningful reform and complex discussion.  
 The final discourse pertinent to this thesis is the “comprehensive reform” discourse. It is 
employed at times when immigration legislation is being proposed, and generally refers to 
“fixing the broken immigration system” through a number of provisions that address multiple 
areas of concern on the topic of immigration. “Comprehensive reform” is often attributed to 
legislation that calls for tighter border control, coupled with fast visa processing, effective guest 
worker programs, and programs that lead to eventual documentation. Language referencing 
coming “out of the shadows” and pathways to citizenship are common within this discourse.28 
An emphasis on “comprehensive reform” and a description of legislation as “comprehensive” 
can lead to complacency with less successful policy. Comprehensive reform also emphasizes 
bipartisanship in the creation of legislation. The enactment of so-called “comprehensive reform” 
means there is a perpetual compromise between opposing constituencies (“bipartisanship”) to 
pass immigration laws, meaning that actual meaningful reform fails to move forward. The 
perpetuation of discourse that gives Americans negative frameworks through which to discuss 
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immigration or frameworks that encourage misunderstandings of the immigrant experience are 
detrimental to effective policy implementation and the immigrant experience alike.  
 I argue that presidential immigration rhetoric made by Presidents Reagan and Clinton is 
unsuccessful in procuring meaningful immigration legislation because the rhetoric contradicts 
itself, contains multiple messages in attempt to appeal to multiple constituencies, and does not 
accurately reflect results of legislation on the lived experience of immigrants in the United 
States.  I specifically examine the presidential immigration rhetoric of Ronald Reagan and Bill 
Clinton in order to show the persistence of rhetoric that contributes to negative immigration 
frameworks throughout the past three and a half decades. The lack of meaningful reform since 
the beginning of the fourth wave of immigration indicates the harmful nature of the continuation 
of these discourses through the rhetoric of the “modern” president. Presidents who came after 
Reagan adopted or were required to navigate the framework for immigration rhetoric under 
which he operated. Democratic presidents, and specifically Clinton, operated on the basis of 
Reagan’s precedent, which has made their rhetoric rather moderate and neoliberal, even while it 
has been more left-leaning than Reagan’s. Operating under the constructs of negative 
immigration frameworks that have existed throughout history but have been exacerbated since 
the 1980s has implications for the development and continuation of rhetoric that fails to secure 
legislation that has a positive, meaningful impact on the lives of immigrants.  
 To show how presidential immigration rhetoric leads to legislation with unfavorable 
outcomes for immigrant populations in the United States, I use public speech content of Reagan 
and Clinton (including official remarks and statements, annually delivered speeches, and 
television interviews) newspaper articles, and secondary source material about immigration 
policy and events. I conduct a qualitative rhetorical analysis of speech in primary resources. 
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While coding all of the public speech content of Reagan and Clinton using a language generator 
could provide insight into rhetorical decisions based on a larger volume of rhetoric, a deeper 
understanding of language found in speeches most pertinent to immigration issues was more 
appropriate for the nature of this thesis. A close reading allows for expanded conversation on 
specific moments that contributed to the frameworks under which immigration is continually 
spoken about.  
Close reading analysis begins in Chapter One, where I discuss Reagan’s active initial 
stance on immigration issues, adopted as numbers of immigrants to the United States rose. 
Reagan’s pro-business approach was evident in his rhetoric, and he frequently used the “nation 
of immigrants” discourse throughout his discussion of the topic. The passing of the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act in 1986 brought with it abstract “amnesty” rhetoric, and results for 
immigrants that contradicted the positive rhetoric Reagan expressed over the bill. Chapter Two 
begins with Clinton’s initial relaxed stance on immigration issues and shows the shift that 
occurred over the course of his presidency to rhetoric that enforced the “nation of immigrants” 
discourse, coupled with pressing language that the U.S. was also a “nation of laws.” Clinton 
adopted Reagan’s preferences for the free market and globalization, shown in discussion of 
rhetoric on the passage of the North America Free Trade Agreement in 1994. The development 
of immigration rhetoric from Reagan to Clinton shows how discussion of this topic has limited 
the prospect for meaningful legislative reform and has consequently had a serious impact on 
immigrant communities in the United States.  
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CHAPTER ONE: Amnesty, the Free Market, and ‘The Great Communicator’  
 
 
The magnet that draws them is freedom and the beacon that guides them is hope. 
America offers liberty for all, encourages hope for betterment, and nurtures great 
expectations. In this free land a person can realize his dreams – going as far as talent and 
drive can carry him. In return America asks each of us to do our best, to work hard, to 
respect the law, to cherish human rights, and to strive for the common good. 
– Ronald Reagan, National Immigrants Day, 1986.1 
 
The 1980s brought a rise in levels of immigration to the United States, and political 
actors, like President Ronald Reagan, responded politically and rhetorically to the changing 
political climate that resulted from this influx. Compelling language, exemplified in the quote 
above, characterized Reagan’s rhetoric on the topic of immigration, as he invoked emotional 
appeals through his speech. As a reputed and charismatic orator, Reagan’s speech-making skills 
and perceptivity to speech informed the ways in which audiences received his public statements 
regarding immigration and immigrants. In an obituary posted shortly after Reagan’s death, Peter 
Hannaford writes, “He was the public speaker – The Great Communicator – to whom all others 
were compared.”2 Shortly after Reagan’s death, Lou Cannon, who was the Washington Post’s 
White House correspondent during the Reagan presidency, wrote that Reagan “earned that title 
[of Great Communicator] because of his skill at talking evocatively and using folksy anecdotes 
that ordinary people could understand.”3 The language in Reagan’s speech was accessible to the 
mass public and this meant he could more easily deliver his rhetorical arguments.  Cannon 
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continues, “Moreover, Reagan paid attention not only to his speeches – but also his audiences’ 
reaction to them… he knew when his speeches were effective and when they weren’t. And when 
they weren’t, he changed them to make them effective the next time.”4 While Cannon spoke with 
intentional fondness in a posthumous tribute, Reagan’s immigration rhetoric did show his ability 
to appeal to various audiences and demonstrated his attentiveness to the constituencies who 
received his rhetoric.  
The path that led Reagan to become known as “The Great Communicator” can be traced 
back to his early professional career in radio announcing. He secured a job as a regular sports 
announcer before he began his acting career in 1937. He became Vice President and then 
President of the Screen Actors Guild, and Hannaford writes, “In later years [Reagan] credited his 
SAG experience with honing the negotiating skills he used so deftly in elective politics and 
summit meetings.”5 Reagan became the General Electric Theater television host in 1954, and this 
role led him to visit factories across the country and meet with workers. It was through 
interactions with factory workers that “he developed his technique of giving brief opening 
remarks about values and the country’s problems, then shifting to taking questions (‘a dialogue, 
not a monologue,” as he put it).”6 Reagan began many of the speeches that he delivered on the 
topic of immigration with that model, with allusion to the immigrant history of the United States, 
using the “nation of immigrants” discourse, after which he delved into pertinent and sometimes-
contradictory issues he intended to discuss. Reagan practiced speaking about his political 
ideology during factory visits as well. Cannon writes that Reagan “went throughout the country 
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speaking to all of these workers at plants, because General Electric’s chairman, Ralph Cordiner, 
had this idea of decentralization. Reagan would speak to audiences, and it was just wonderful 
political training.”7 Opportunities to speak to large groups of workers about political and 
economic issues, particularly the “menace of the Communist movement,” set the stage for 
Reagan’s entrance into politics, his campaign for governor of California, and later, his campaign 
for the presidency under a pro-business Republican framework. By honing his speaking skills, 
Reagan learned how to most effectively employ rhetoric that appealed to desired constituencies. 
His consequent rhetoric contributed to “nation of immigrants” discourse, economically based 
discourses about resources, jobs, and work ethic of immigrants, and “amnesty” rhetoric that fell 
precariously between discourses of “legality” and “illegality.” 
With Reagan’s particular oratory talent in mind, this chapter begins with a discussion of 
his initial rhetorical reactions to rising levels of immigration to the United States. Reagan was 
attentive to immigration politics and public sentiment at the outset of his presidency, and held a 
distinctly pro-business stance in his immigration rhetoric that reinforced economic interests for 
“legal” immigration. Reagan grounded the need for active immigration legislation and rhetoric 
on the basis of reports released by expert groups and commissions that were formed at the 
beginning of his presidency, as well as the 1980 Refugee Act. I argue that Reagan, informed to 
act on immigration issues at the beginning of his presidency, used the “nation of immigrants” 
discourse in order to situate the U.S. as a country that benefited from immigrants (and their 
laborious economic contributions). Meanwhile, his accompanying language implied themes of 
limited resources and “legality” and was ultimately restrictive in nature. Reagan’s rhetorical 
contradictions were particularly evident during his presidential campaign tours, and also in 
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debates and the eventual passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986. 
Reagan’s positive rhetorical tone in discussion about “amnesty” legislation as forgiveness to 
immigrants for wrongdoing, outside the dichotomy of “legal” and “illegal,” contradicted IRCA’s 
results for immigrant communities. Contrary rhetoric, coupled with actions on immigration and 
refugee policy couched in language of national security of U.S. resources, led to unintended and 
often detrimental consequences for immigrant populations.  
The climate surrounding immigration politics in the 1980s was largely shaped by the 
influx of immigrants to the United States prior to the decade, resulting from the termination of 
the Bracero program and the passing of the 1965 Immigration Act. The influx of immigrants 
entering the U.S. leading up to the 1980s is known as the fourth (and current) wave of 
immigration in the United States. The termination of the Bracero program meant that immigrants 
who had served as documented temporary workers lost their jobs, but some remained in the U.S. 
and overstayed their visas. The termination of the legal pathway to immigration that the Bracero 
program provided meant that unauthorized immigration rose in the 1970s and 1980s. When the 
1965 Immigration Act passed, it removed categorical exclusions from immigrant admission laws 
that were primarily in place for non-European sending countries, which meant that Asian, 
African, and Middle Eastern immigrants were eligible for entry to the United States. Instead of 
explicit categorical exclusions, the 1965 Act implemented a preference system for family-
reunification and highly skilled workers who migrated to the United States. It also allowed 
asylum seekers (primarily from Communist-led countries) to seek refuge in the United States. 
While largely seen as a symbolic gesture to show America’s lack of hypocrisy during the Civil 
Rights movement, the 1965 Immigration Act effectively led to an increase in immigration to the 
U.S. and a shift in the makeup of the immigrant population. The increased number of immigrants 
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as a result of these events led to a consequent desire to curb immigration flows, and this shaped 
immigration politics at the beginning of Reagan’s presidency.  
Reagan’s initial stance on immigration appeared to be proactive, perhaps as a result of the 
heightened awareness of immigration politics due to the increased number of immigrants 
entering the United States. His initial stance was also economically driven. In Dividing Lines: the 
Politics of Immigration Control in America, Daniel Tichenor writes, “During his 1980 
presidential campaign, Reagan endorsed the notion of a North American free trade zone in which 
goods, services, technology, and workers could move freely across U.S., Canadian, and Mexican 
borders.”8 While a North American free-trade zone initiative did not come to light until the 
Clinton administration in 1994, Reagan’s campaign showed an economically motivated 
immigration stance and an intentional focus of attention to immigration as a political issue. In an 
article in the New York Times in 1980, Howell Raines wrote about statements Reagan made 
while he traveled through Texas on his presidential campaign. Raines noted that Reagan used the 
term “undocumented” during his campaign, at this instance particularly in the state of Texas. The 
use of the term “undocumented,” as opposed to use of the term “illegal,” was relatively 
unprecedented at this time and showed that Reagan was aware of the beneficial political use of 
this term in a border state. Reagan’s language use suggested that he was taking a proactive stance 
that acknowledged immigrants while also prioritizing his political agenda.  
New refugee legislation passed in 1980 as Reagan campaigned for the presidential 
election. The 1980 Refugee Act passed with “narrow majority” and contributed to shifts in 
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immigration politics at the beginning of the 1980s.9 The 1980 Refugee Act ended the refugee 
system enacted in the 1965 Act (to admit refugees from Communist countries), called for 
regularized flows of refugees, and set a maximum capacity ceiling at 50,000 admissions. It 
created funding for a U.S. Coordinator of Refugee Affairs, created more refugee assistance 
opportunities, regularized resettlement programs, and required annual consultation between the 
White House and relevant congressional committees. Finally, it aligned the United States’ 
refugee law with United Nations protocol on the definition of a refugee. Before this provision in 
the 1980 Refugee Act, the U.S. had the ability to blatantly accept refugees on the basis of the 
government’s Cold War agenda. The Select Committee on Immigration and Refugee Policy was 
also formed through the legislation.  
In 1981, Reagan spoke about the task force that was created to have a more informed 
basis for the implementation of immigration policy and immigration agenda priorities during his 
administration. The Task Force on Immigration and Refugee Policy presented a package to 
Congress, with principles “designed to preserve our tradition of accepting foreigners to our 
shores, but to accept them in a controlled and orderly fashion.”10 Reagan’s description of these 
principles invoked the “nation of immigrants” discourse, and alludes to immigration as a 
founding attribute of the U.S. that must be legally adhered to in the present day. In this 
statement, Reagan explained the principles that the Task Force on Immigration and Refugee 
Policy presented. These principles were to continue “America’s tradition as a land that welcomes 
peoples from other countries” while acknowledging the shared responsibility with other 
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countries for resettling those people, and to provide adequate legal authority and control that 
strengthened enforcement and made immigration law efficient and “consistent with our values of 
individual privacy and freedom.”11 Economically influenced principles outlined in the report 
were to reflect the U.S.’s neighborly relationships with Mexico and Canada, to “recognize that 
both the United States and Mexico have historically benefited from Mexicans obtaining 
employment in the United States” (and that “a number of our states have special labor needs, and 
we should take these into account”), and to recognize and provide legal status for the productive 
and established “illegal work force” in the United States while also discouraging further “illegal” 
immigration. Principles designed to address limited resources in the United States were to 
improve the capacity of governmental agencies to deal with immigration matters and fair 
distribution of benefits across different parts of the country, to find ways to integrate refugees 
“without nurturing their dependence on welfare,” and to “seek greater international cooperation 
in the resettlement of refugees and, in the Caribbean Basin, international cooperation to assist 
accelerated economic development to reduce motivations for illegal immigration.”12 The 
principles Reagan outlined from the Task Force and the way in which he delivered them gave 
weight to certain desired understandings of the immigration agenda moving forward on the basis 
of the report. Reagan described the principles proposed, and used language that appealed to 
restrictive immigration ideals while it also perpetuated narratives about welcoming immigrants 
unconditionally. Additionally, Reagan called for an acknowledgment of the economic 
advantages of immigrant labor, and highlighted the special labor needs filled by immigrant 
workers and the benefits that would come from providing legal status for the “illegal work 
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force.” Reagan discussed refugee admittance, made allusion to economic concerns regarding 
immigration when he said he did not want refugees to be dependent on welfare, specifically 
mentioning refugees from the Caribbean basin, while he maintained a welcoming and 
humanitarian-based narrative.  
Reagan opened this speech with the following lines: “Our nation is a nation of 
immigrants. More than any other country, our strength comes from our capacity to welcome 
those from other lands. No free and prosperous nation can by itself accommodate all those who 
seek a better life or flee persecution. We must share this responsibility with other countries.”13 
With this statement, Reagan employed rhetoric that enforced the “nation of immigrants” 
discourse, while he maintained a stance of adherence to certain limits to immigration admittance. 
Reagan’s interpretation of the Task Force recommendation in his Statement on United States 
Immigration and Refugee Policy set the tone for his immigration agenda at the beginning of his 
presidency. He spoke about refugees and immigrants in conjunction, and this allowed him to 
make statements through a humanitarian lens, while he also discussed legality. He combined the 
“nation of immigrants” discourse with sentiments about economics and legality that set a limit on 
the narrative of welcoming immigrants to America’s shores. Ultimately, Reagan was 
forthcoming in his statements about his desire to work toward immigration reform based on the 
recommendations of the report.  
In addition to Reagan’s statements about the report of recommendations on immigration 
released by the Task Force, the Justice Department and the Attorney General also issued 
statements. On the basis of the report, the Justice Department recommended enhancing Border 
Patrol, stronger enforcement of labor laws, civil fines for employers hiring undocumented 
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immigrants, a worker verification system, the possibility of experimenting with a guest worker 
program, and some amnesty (the level of which would be appropriately determined).14 JoAnne 
Spotts, who outlines immigration politics from the Reagan to the Clinton era, writes, “Both the 
Attorney General and the President’s statement reiterated the recommendations contained in the 
Justice Department’s statement, but the President stressed his support of a continuation of high 
levels of legal immigration.”15 The Justice Department and the Attorney General placed the 
principles outlined in the Task Force’s report [and that Reagan outlined in his statement] in 
tangible legislative terms that could be translated into policy action. Based on the 
recommendations that could lead to tangible legal action, Reagan’s initial immigration stance 
was a proactive one. It was grounded on the idea that reform to immigration policy was 
necessary to create certain limits to immigration and immigrant use of resources, but that the 
“nation of immigrants” narrative should be used to encourage immigrants who could provide the 
fulfillment of labor needs to the U.S. economy to come to the country using authorized 
pathways.   
The Task Force’s recommendations on refugees (and Reagan’s retelling of them) indicate 
further initial stances on the influx of bodies into the U.S. at the beginning of the 1980s. U.S. 
foreign relations and identification of allies during the Cold War contributed to the large number 
of individuals who sought asylum in the United States. The recommendations on refugee 
admittance and procedure stemmed from an influx of refugees from Cuba and Haiti during this 
time period. Responses to this influx shifted after President Carter’s administration, and Cuban 
and Haitian refugees shaped most of the discussion surrounding asylum policy at this time. 	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Denise Bostdorff, who delivered arguments about presidential rhetoric on Haitian refugees at a 
conference at Texas A&M, explains how there was negative public sentiment in reaction to the 
way that President Carter handled the Mariel Boatlift16 and Haitian refugee crisis. Carter handled 
the crisis in a more liberal fashion and “led the Reagan Administration, as well as those that 
would follow, to believe ‘that a powerful restrictionist current of public opinion would emerge to 
punish any president who was perceived as permitting a weak immigration policy that did not 
safeguard the nation’s frontiers.’17 The discrepancy between admittance of Cubans versus 
Haitians seeking entrance into the United States was that the Haitian government was friendly 
with the United States government, and consequently Haitians had greater restrictions placed 
upon their entrance to the country while seeking asylum. Haitian refugees became inadmissible 
to the U.S. and Reagan adopted a policy that mandated that if refugees could not touch land in 
the U.S., they could not apply for asylum. This meant that Haitians fleeing by boat and 
intercepted at sea were ineligible. Borstdoff writes, “Preventing Haitians from reaching the shore 
forestalled their ability to become political refugees. Critics argued that Reagan’s policy violated 
both the 1967 United Nations Protocol, as well as the 1980 Refugee Act that had incorporated 
it.”18 Reagan claimed that eligibility for asylum was being determined aboard Coast Guard ships 
and was consequently not as harsh as critics suggested. “Yet,” Bostdorff writes, “as immigration 
legal scholar Arthur Helton pointed out, from 1981 through 1991, only 28 of 23,000 Haitians 
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interdicted at sea were allowed to go to the United States to apply for asylum – an especially low 
number given the repression of the Duvalier government and the brutal U.S. supported regimes 
that followed until Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s election in December 1990.”19 U.S. foreign relations 
and interests clearly played a role in the policies surrounding Haitian refugees and the 
accompanying rhetoric, and support for Duvalier as the leader of the regime and as an ally in the 
Cold War had a profound effect on migration to the United States and consequent political and 
rhetorical reaction to that migration.   
An additional contributor to initial immigration politics and Reagan’s consequent stance 
and rhetoric at the beginning of the 1980s was the Select Committee on Immigration and 
Refugee Policy (SCIRP). SCIRP was “created to avert a political backlash against immigration 
and to quiet intraparty battles over employer sanctions in the late 1970s.”20 Having a third party 
to provide expert opinion on immigration was helpful in curbing political disagreements. 
Tichenor writes that SCIRP “played a significant role in immigration politics of the 1980s by 
advancing a ‘policy paradigm’ that helped frame reform choices and official narratives for over a 
decade.”21 The report that SCIRP published in 1981 emphasized that “illegal” immigration had 
to be controlled before “legal” immigration policy could be revisited. With this recommendation, 
SCIRP introduced the trope that the U.S. must “close the back door” before it would be able to 
“open the front door.” Tichenor argues that SCIRP’s “contrasting portraits of illegal and legal 
immigration had the more lasting effect of helping to decouple these two migratory streams in 
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national politics.”22 The decoupling of “legal” and “illegal” shaped how immigration was spoken 
about at the public, legislative, and executive level in decades to follow, and had consequent 
effects on how reform was structured surrounding the two binary categories of legality. SCIRP 
set a rhetorical and legislative framework for immigration discussion in the 1980s, and it 
contributed to Reagan’s initial framework for discussion and initial agenda on immigration 
politics. Further, it reiterated and made distinct the dichotomous categories of “legal” and 
“illegal” immigration, which left little room for rhetorical or political grey area on the topic of 
immigration.  
Reagan further solidified his initial stance on immigration and his characterizations of 
immigrants when he announced National Hispanic Heritage Week in 1981. He acknowledged, 
“[Hispanic] influence on our nation began with the Spaniards long before our revolution brought 
independence from England.”23 Reagan’s acknowledgment here placed Hispanic influence in a 
historic and distant past, and functioned in the same way that the “nation of immigrants” 
discourse functioned and continues to function. Reagan discussed how Hispanic architecture, art, 
history, and language could be found in the United States as evidence of Hispanic historical and 
cultural influence.  Reagan discussed attributes of Hispanic immigrants that make them “good” 
and “hardworking” immigrants. He said, “The Hispanic peoples today add to our strength as a 
nation with their strong devotion to family, deep religious convictions, pride in their language 
and heritage and commitment to earning a livelihood by hard work.”24 Reagan’s description of 
Hispanic people as hardworking and committed to religion and family placed them as important 	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contributors to American social ideals. He further characterized Hispanic immigrants as he 
discussed individual immigrants who made contributions to the fields of science and technology, 
business, and public service. Reagan particularly pointed to public officials and mayors of 
Hispanic origin of major U.S. cities. Reagan concluded with an assertion of the necessity of 
giving deserved recognition to contributions of Hispanic Americans, and called for all citizens to 
reflect on the “brotherhood that binds [them] together as one people.”25 With this proclamation, 
Reagan appealed to Hispanic American constituents, while he simultaneously placed their 
beginnings in the U.S. in the past, which made them a very distinctly “legal,” hardworking, and 
moral immigrant.  
With an initial immigration agenda established, Reagan began discussion of legislation 
introduced at the beginning of his administration. The Simpson-Mazzoli Bill was initially 
introduced in the early 1980s by Republican Senator Alan Simpson from Wyoming and 
Democratic Representative Romano Mazzoli from Kentucky. It proposed a number of reforms to 
the immigration system in the realms of immigrant admission and employment. It included 
employer sanctions and border enforcement provisions.  
In three television interviews in San Antonio, Texas, in July of 1984, Reagan discussed 
the bill and answered other questions pertaining to immigration. In his first interview, with Mr. 
Marrou of KENS TV, Reagan said, “I believe that [the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill] is a legitimate 
effort to regain control of our borders. We know that about 120 miles of the 2,000-mile border – 
that 120 miles in the Southwest – is our greatest problem. And we have approved a thousand 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25. Ibid.  
 
Slauson 32 
more INS personnel.”26 Reagan’s rhetoric about control of the U.S.-Mexico border in a border-
state like Texas showed his attentiveness to his audience and their likely concerns. Reagan’s 
enforcement rhetoric reinforced the idea that national security must be secured along the U.S.-
Mexico border through proactive legislation. Marrou asked Reagan to reassure fears about 
Hispanics being required to carry an identification card in order to prove their citizenship. 
Reagan replied:  
Well, we want to take every precaution we can to see that there won’t be what so many 
fear – just an automatic ruling of them out as employees. That would be unconscionable. 
And we want to be very careful that while we have safeguards to prevent employers from 
hiring the undocumented workers, that at the same time there is no discrimination against 
those who will be legalized under this bill, those who may still be undocumented but 
who’ve lived for a long period of time, put down roots in our society. We want to give 
them the right to legally live here and those who, as you say, are citizens.27 
Reagan used the term “undocumented” in this (presumably) relatively candid television 
interview, which showed his attention to audience in a state with a large immigrant population. 
The fact that Reagan used the term “undocumented” at all, rather than the term “illegal,” was 
significant because it strayed from the strict binary of “legal” and “illegal” rhetoric and 
characterizations, and appealed to his desire to introduce an amnesty program that would provide 
documentation for “hardworking” immigrants who were significant contributors to the economy. 
While he entered the grey area between “legality” and “illegality” with comments regarding 
rights and documentation for immigrants who were not authorized to be in the country, he 
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appealed to the “legality” discourse when he stated that he wanted to “give them the right to 
legally live” in the United States.  
Reagan’s second interview in San Antonio was with David Scott from KMOL TV. Scott 
expressed qualms with the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill, and stated, “A lot of folks down here in Texas 
don’t like it for a lot of reasons. Some people say it handles illegals in an arbitrary fashion, that it 
will produce discrimination against legal Hispanics here, that it’s going to hurt businessmen, that 
it’s going to be costly, that it won’t be effective.”28 Reagan replied that the bill would be cost 
effective and fair, “and it’s also necessary, because the simple truth is we’ve lost control of our 
borders. And no country can afford that.”29 Reagan’s response appealed to Texans and alluded to 
the concept of controlling costly “illegal” immigration. Reagan likely emphasized a secure 
border in an effort to ensure support for the legalization of immigrants who were already living 
in the United States. Reagan continued:  
And I’m convinced that we can protect our Hispanic American citizens from 
discrimination just on the basis that an employer might be afraid to hire them. We’re 
going to protect their rights. At the same time, we’re also going to have compassion and 
legalize those who came here some time ago and have legitimately put roots down and 
are living as legal residents of our country, even though illegal. We’re going to make 
them legal.30 
Reagan repeated sentiments from his first interview about the need to give documented status to 
immigrants who have “put roots down” in the United States. His persuasive technique was 
confusing here, though, and showed the difficulty in the proposal of policy that falls somewhere 	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between “legal” and “illegal.” Reagan’s desired amnesty program was difficult for him to 
support within this dichotomous framework of legality. The proposition that immigrants who 
would receive authorization had been in the United States for some length of time was a 
compelling rhetorical device for garnering reassurance about the proposed bill to skeptical 
constituents. Unclear and ambiguous language that described immigrants as “legal residents of 
our country, even though illegal,” made it easier to make a vague claim rather than explicitly 
outline the specifics of amnesty legislation provisions. Reagan appealed directly to his 
constituents, particularly those with voting power, in the following exchange:  
Scott: Why, then, sir, have your most ardent supporters down here in Texas fought you 
on this bill? And might not it cost you in the State come fall? 
Reagan: Well, I hope that they would give us the benefit of the doubt and recognize how 
much we mean to protect their interests.31 
Reagan’s rhetoric framed the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill as beneficial to Texans and to U.S.-born 
constituents, but he ensured that it would also benefit established immigrants.  
Deborah Daniels from KSAT conducted Reagan’s third interview in San Antonio. 
Reagan echoed sentiments he made in his interview with Marrou, and urged the need to address 
the 120 miles along the border that proved particularly problematic. Reagan also discussed the 
Simpson-Mazzoli bill further. He stated, “…we think that the program is going to provide for 
documented workers crossing the border to fill needs, particularly in agriculture. We think that 
we, with compassion, are going to recognize the problem of those undocumented immigrants to 
our country who have been here for a number of years, who’ve established a base and a home 
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and put down roots, and we’re going to legalize them.”32 Reagan continued his candid use of the 
term “undocumented,” here. He also revealed his free-market expansionist agenda, as he stated 
that immigrants fill labor needs in specific sectors of the U.S. economy. Tichenor describes the 
“free-market expansionist” framework as one based on the belief that immigrant rights in the 
U.S. should be restricted, while immigrant admissions to the U.S. should be expanded. Free-
market expansionists would assert that immigrants who are already in the United States are an 
ideal population to fill labor needs. 33 Reagan’s beliefs seemed likely to be economically driven 
and founded in an ideal “free-market” where labor and goods could flow freely across national 
borders. Reagan contributed to a humanitarian discourse when he discussed the compassion with 
which U.S.-born citizens must treat immigrants (both documented and undocumented) who have 
established lives and families and good morals of hard work in the country.  
Additionally, Reagan repeated sentiments in his KSAT interview that he made earlier in 
the day about protecting immigrants from exploitation and blackmail in the workplace. Daniels 
asked, “I’d like to know how important you feel the Hispanic vote will be in the upcoming 
election, and what are the Republicans and your administration offering Hispanics?”34 Reagan 
replied that the Hispanic vote was important to him, as it had been in the 1980 campaign, and 
that he was trying hard to secure the vote of this population. Reagan explicitly stated his agenda 
to win Hispanic votes, and made clear that this constituency was important to him. He stated, 
“The other party has believed in handouts, grants, welfare – the making of people dependent. 	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And in my view, the Americans of Hispanic origin, their values are based on family and religion, 
on all the basic good values of ethics and work ethic, and they want to be independent. And 
that’s what we offer – is opportunity.”35 By framing Democrats as “the other party,” Reagan 
aligned his Republican political ideology with the characterizations he made about immigrants, 
while he ostracized Democratic Party ideology by characterizing immigrants as having inherent 
moral values that align with the Republican Party. Sentiments that characterized immigrants as 
having particular moral values aligning with specific political ideologies had the capacity to 
appeal to voters with an immigrant background as well as to those without. The fact that Reagan 
spoke in anticipation of an upcoming election likely shaped how he rhetorically framed the 
provisions of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill to a Texan audience during these three interviews.  
At a moment when versions of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill were debated at the White 
House, top Reagan administration advisors showed skepticism about the reform package. 
Tichenor explains that in the face of this skepticism, “Simpson and Smith [another representative 
who advocated for the bill at the time] reminded Reagan that presidential resistance would not 
compare favorably with the House Democratic leadership’s decision to permit action on a 
problem that continued to trouble the mass electorate and the media.”36 Thus, Reagan’s stance 
was informed by his desire to use his political power, to be seen as a leader who was taking 
action on an issue to which Democrats were attentive. This version of the bill failed, because the 
House and Senate could not agree on the terms set forth by the administration for its passing. 
Despite initial failures, “finally, in an era of divided government, both the House Democratic 
leadership and the Reagan White House were eager to avoid blame for killing an illegal 	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immigration control initiative endorsed by SCIRP, the media, and the general public.”37 The bill 
was signed into law as the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986.  
The stated goal of IRCA was to restrict the flow of undocumented immigrants into the 
United States, under the assumption that if the legislation allowed undocumented but established 
immigrants to “legalize” under an amnesty provision, numbers of undocumented immigrants 
would decrease in the country and would stem future flows of documented and undocumented 
immigration. The “amnesty” provision of the law was controversial due to the rhetorical 
arguments surrounding the term and consequent attempts to counter its implications. 
Rhetorically, granting amnesty implied “forgiveness” and could be interpreted as a breakdown of 
strict categories of “legal” and “illegal.” Amnesty can be conceptualized as existing in the grey 
area between “legal” and “illegal,” as it granted documentation to a population that was 
previously framed as “illegal” and undocumented. In the midst of lobbying and efforts to pass 
immigration reform, the plausibility of defining legislation as “amnesty” was debated. In 
addition to the difficulty in articulating “amnesty” within preexisting frameworks, Orrenius and 
Zavodny explain that amnesties are hard political sells, but that they make the most sense given 
the size of the undocumented population in the United States.38 Amnesties are hard political sells 
because they do not fall under the category of “legal” or “illegal” in terms of immigration, and 
certain groups see them as granting favors to people who have not earned those favors. In 
contrasting logic, “amnesty” implies that people who are “granted” amnesty have done 
something wrong for which they must be forgiven, which can ostracize immigrants. Reagan’s 
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attempt to defend an amnesty provision was difficult because of reinforced discursive 
frameworks of “legal” and “illegal” that tend to be difficult to break due to the way that they 
shape societal structure in the United States. 
In this particular case, amnesty required complementary restrictive legislation that called 
for an increased presence of law enforcement at the border and sanctions for employers who 
hired undocumented immigrants. Orrenius and Zavodny explain “because it is impossible to 
credibly commit to not conducting repeated amnesties, it is vital that a legalization program be 
accompanied by other reforms that make future amnesties less likely.”39 Political implications of 
enacting an amnesty were considered in forming arguments about rhetorical implications. Perry 
writes, “In keeping with the American tradition of turning to the law to resolve social issues, 
amnesty was thus a promise of freedom and civil rights that the self-proclaimed ‘nation of 
immigrants’… conferred to all citizens, and in the 1980s that promise of freedom for a diverse 
populace was especially compelling.”40 The U.S. social contract calls for democracy and 
freedom for all, and an amnesty could fulfill that ideal while it also appealed to free-market 
expansionists who wanted to increase the size of the workforce.  
Ultimately, legislators, politicians, and other stakeholders who endorsed amnesty were 
able to pass the legislation. Under IRCA, documentation was provided for immigrants who could 
prove their residence in the United States since January 1, 1982. Legally Authorized workers 
were those who could prove continuous U.S. residence for at least five years, while Special 
Agricultural Workers were those who could prove ninety days of employment in the U.S. 
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agriculture industry. Return migration after labor needs were met was encouraged for Special 
Agricultural Workers, and they were largely considered seasonal immigrants. IRCA created the 
H-2A and H-2B programs. Immigrants with Temporary Worker Cards could apply for 
permanent residency after one year of consistent employment in the United States, but were 
prohibited from public cash assistance programs until five years after their documentation. 
Family members of immigrants who received documentation through IRCA were eligible to join 
their documented relatives in the U.S. after 1989, and beneficiaries became eligible for U.S. 
citizenship in 1994. Provision 245(i) allowed beneficiaries who were living undocumented in the 
U.S. already to pay a fine and adjust to documented life without the requirement of meeting an 
entry bar.41 Provisions of IRCA that provided political countering to the granting of “amnesty” 
were employer sanctions, introduced to hold employers accountable for hiring workers who 
could prove documentation, and increased border enforcement. Employers were required to 
prove the “legality” of the employees they hired, and harsher penalties were enacted for those 
who could not.  
Overall, response to IRCA was relatively critical of its failure to fulfill its goal of 
decreasing undocumented immigration to the United States. Tichenor writes, “Originally 
designed as a restrictive enforcement measure, IRCA proved to be surprisingly expansive in both 
design and effect.”42 IRCA is credited with increasing both documented and undocumented 
immigration flows into the United States after is enactment. Further, Orrenius and Zavodny 
explain the shortcomings of the provisions that were meant to counter the documentation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41. Orrenius and Zavodny, “The Economic Consequences of Amnesty for Unauthorized 
Immigrants,” 90.  
 
42. Tichenor, Dividing Lines, 262.  
 
Slauson 40 
millions of previously undocumented immigrants. They write, “The U.S. experience after IRCA 
indicates that an amnesty not accompanied by a well-designed, comprehensive overhaul of legal 
immigration policy can lead to increased legal and illegal flows and political backlashes.”43 
IRCA not only led to an influx of documented and undocumented immigrants to the United 
States, but this rise led to consequent restrictive legislation, formed to curb immigration.  
The economic impact of IRCA was particularly well examined. IRCA led to declined 
wages, a rise in informal sector employment, and an increase in the receipt of cash wages for 
workers of immigrant background. Donato et. al conducted a study to examine economic results 
of IRCA for immigrants of various different nations of origin. They write, “…we observed 
significant signs of worsened labour [sic] market outcomes before and after 1986 among 
Mexicans and other Latinos, our findings suggest lower wages after 1986.”44 Worsened labor 
market conditions included employer abuses and a rise in fraudulent document use in order to 
bypass adherence to strict provisions. Congress proposed a fraud-resistant system to address the 
spotty enforcement of employer sanctions, yet “the Reagan Administration… was against 
establishing such a system on the grounds that it was too costly and would result in an invasion 
of privacy. Consequently, President Reagan failed to exercise this authority granted to him 
pursuant to IRCA.”45 Fraudulent document use rose as a means of maintaining employment for 
immigrants and functioned as a way for employers to maintain a source of cheap labor. 
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Employer abuses continued despite the enactment of increased penalties for hiring 
undocumented immigrants, and sanctions were not readily enforced with any consistency. Perry 
writes, “What amnesty actually did was keep mostly male, mostly Mexican amnesty applicants, 
highly dependant [sic] upon and thus highly vulnerable to employer abuses during the five-year 
waiting period.”46 Employer sanctions that were meant to balance the amnesty provision actually 
served to complicate the legalization process and decreased protection for immigrants from 
exploitation.  
Employer abuses that resulted from the enactment of IRCA included discriminatory 
hiring practices, and demographics played a role in how IRCA affected immigrants. An 
investigation by the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that IRCA resulted in 
discrimination by employers, who avoided hiring people of Latino descent (or that they 
perceived to be of Latino descent) for fear that they might be undocumented. “The findings 
indicate that IRCA-related discrimination occurs, although our estimates suggest only a small 
number of Hispanics are adversely affected.”47 While the report indicated only slight effects of 
discrimination, the documentation that it occurred at a more than aversive level showed the 
inherent ambiguity of the provision. Mexicans were the largest national group who received 
amnesty. Mexicans comprised 1.3 million LAWs [of 1.7 million] and 1 million SAWs [of 1.1 
million].48 Despite the clear majority of amnesty recipients who were Mexican, groups from 
other countries of origin also received amnesty under IRCA. Donato et. al studied differences in 	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the consequences of IRCA between Mexican, Nicaraguan, and Dominican migrants, because 
they wanted to counter broad generalizations of the effects of IRCA and “to assess whether 
employment effects that are linked to the passage of recent immigration policies and have been 
documented for Mexicans hold for immigrants from two other national origins: Nicaragua and 
the Dominican Republic.”49 They studied consequences for immigrants from Nicaragua and the 
Dominican Republic in particular because they were among the top sending nations in 2000, 
according to the U.S. Department of Justice. They concluded that Dominicans and Nicaraguans 
faced similar lowered wages and downturns in economic success after 1986. They suggest that 
there was a broader negative economic effect for smaller groups within the overarching Latino 
migrant community (even in immigrants who typically have better English language skills and 
more formal schooling, like Nicaraguans and Dominicans).50 
The consequences of the passage of IRCA can also be examined through a gendered lens, 
and gendered consequences indicate how the law could be interpreted in ways that 
disenfranchised certain groups. Disenfranchising consequences of IRCA that were particularly 
gendered included vulnerability for immigrant women and the perpetuation of stereotypes 
regarding immigrant women. Perry writes, “[IRCA] excluded women and thereby made 
undocumented women and those few waiting to legalize hyper-vulnerable to sexual abuse and 
violence as they worked hard, and the SAW programme [sic] directly extracted temporary labour 
[sic] from Mexican men.”51 The type of labor that led to the opportunity for legalization was 
particularly aimed at men: hard day labor that is stereotypically a male-dominated employment 	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sector. Female immigrants typically dominated service-industry jobs and domestic work, which 
were not directly encouraged within IRCA’s provisions, like agriculturally based jobs, more 
typical for men, were. Perry writes, “The text of the law and the possibility for enfranchisement 
that it offered was race and gender neutral but amnesty was administered in racist and sexist 
ways that facilitated the exploitation of immigrant labour [sic] and impoverishment of immigrant 
women.”52 Further, Perry argues that provisions within IRCA ultimately disenfranchised 
immigrant mothers of color. The disenfranchisement of immigrant women was due in part to 
interpretations and practical applications of IRCA provisions in the employment sector, but also 
due to stereotypes that were socially reinforced about women of color, specifically mothers, who 
were dependent on welfare. Perry writes, “While proposed cuts of family reunification failed, 
welfare restrictions included in IRCA directly tackled the fears provoked by women’s 
immigration and combined with increased border militarization and employer restrictions 
effectively made Mexican female immigrants unrespectable and thus undeserving of rights.”53 
Rhetoric surrounding women’s use of and reliance on welfare shaped the material consequences 
immigrant women felt after the passing of IRCA. Gendered rhetoric reinforced the notion that 
women were using limited resources that they did not deserve, not only as members of the lower 
socioeconomic class but also as “undeserving” immigrants. 
Unsurprisingly, Reagan’s rhetoric in statements regarding IRCA on the day he signed it 
pointed to the positive attributes of the law, though his language was harmful in its ambiguity 
and appealed to restrictive constituencies despite the expansive nature of the legislation. He 
explained that IRCA was “the most comprehensive reform of our immigration laws since 	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1952.”54 Despite clear room for interpretive biases within IRCA’s provisions, Reagan reinforced 
the idea that the bill would eliminate discrimination. Reagan explained: “Our objective is only to 
establish a reasonable, fair, orderly, and secure system of immigration into this country and not 
to discriminate in any way against particular nations or people.”55 With this statement, Reagan 
asserted the democratic nature of the reform while he ensured adherence to law, which by nature 
is supposedly objective despite lacking reflections of objectivity in applied practice. Perry writes 
about the way that rhetoric clouded some of Reagan’s seemingly inclusive language: “…the 
material consequences of the law – namely the bureaucratic red tape that kept disproportionately 
Mexican male amnesty applicants legally liminal and highly dependent on their employers 
during a five-year waiting period, women’s exclusion from amnesty, and the bald neocolonial 
extraction of temporary labour [sic] from Mexican men – were masked by the rhetoric of 
inclusion in the ‘nation of immigrants.’”56 Reagan’s discussion of the democratic and universally 
liberal ideal of admitting immigrants from all nations fell short in the implementation of IRCA’s 
amnesty program and accompanying strict employment and border enforcement provisions.  
The “comprehensive reform” rhetoric that Reagan used throughout his statements on 
signing IRCA ensured constituencies that this bill would appeal to their interests. Reagan stated, 
“The administration and the allies of immigration reform on both sides of the capital and both 
sides of the aisle worked together to accomplish these critically important reforms to control 	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illegal immigration.”57 Gonzales argues that immigration policy reform is not actually 
implemented because of the assumption that reformers, advocates, and politicians have met at a 
“compromised middle ground” that requires no further action and consequent complacency.58 In 
his statements while signing the bill, Reagan discussed the various provisions and emphasized 
the bipartisan nature of the “comprehensive reform.” He acknowledged the legislators who made 
large contributions to the creation and passage of the act, further solidifying the idea that the 
legislation was all encompassing and comprehensive.  
Reagan implied “legality” and “illegality” discourse as he said, “Future generations of 
Americans will be thankful for our efforts to humanely regain control of our borders and thereby 
preserve the value of one of the most sacred possessions of our people: American citizenship.”59 
Reagan’s vague language did not explicitly define what it meant to be a “citizen” of the United 
States, but he alluded, here, to the way that citizenship can be “possessed.” The possession of 
citizenship as a core American value was irrelevant to legalization provisions of IRCA, as those 
provisions provided temporary legal documentation until a certain waiting period had been 
fulfilled and an immigrant could then apply for naturalization and thereby acquire citizenship. 
However, allusion to citizenship enforced the idea that strict measures would prevent immigrants 
from taking this “possession” from U.S.-born people living in the United States. Reagan’s 
comments surrounding IRCA showed his attentiveness to “amnesty” as a difficult political sell, 
while his more restrictive and nationalistic language appealed to both pro- and anti-immigrant 
sentiment.  	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Ambiguity and contradictions in Reagan’s rhetoric continued in his discussions about 
refugees, which was clear during the Haitian refugee crisis but also in his rhetoric surrounding 
U.S. foreign relations with Central American countries whose refugees were selectively admitted 
to the United States. Contradictions abound as U.S. foreign relations dictate influxes of 
immigrants and refugees attempting to enter the U.S., while restrictive policy and the 
maintenance of relationships and aid to oppressive governments keeps the U.S. from allowing 
entrance to people fleeing persecution from allied governments. The United States often admits 
refugees from governments it is unfriendly with and does not admit refugees from governments 
that it is friendly with, because admitting refugees on the basis of political oppression or lack of 
safety would indicate that the U.S. takes issue with the government from which the refugee is 
fleeing. Political refugees are a distinct category separate from economic refugees, who not only 
struggle in their country of origin on the potential basis of lack of economic stability, but who 
also struggle in their country of origin due to persecution on the basis of an identifying group to 
which they belong. Bostdorff argues that ambiguous and ambivalent rhetoric employed in 
discussion of refugee admittance is indicative of the inequalities in the implementation of 
immigration law and specifically of asylum law.  
Examples of inequalities between different groups of refugees include Haitian refugees 
versus Cuban refugees, as discussed earlier, but also between Nicaraguans and Salvadorans, 
Guatemalans, and Hondurans.60 For example, while Haitian refugees were barred from applying 
for asylum if they did not touch U.S. land or were offered the opportunity upon Coast Guard 
ships, Cuban refugees had particular provisions in place that shifted but were ultimately more 
accepting. At the end of the summer of 1986, brief contradiction to admittance practices took 	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place, as Cuban refugee admittance was restricted. Reagan’s statements on this shift provided 
limited and vague understandings of refugee policy. He stated, “I have determined that it is in the 
interest of the United States to suspend entry into the United States as immigrants by all Cuban 
nationals, with the exceptions noted below, pending restoration of normal migration procedures 
between the two countries.”61 Exceptions included immediate relatives of Cuban immigrants in 
the U.S., preference immigrants who applied at consular posts prior to the date of the 
proclamation of barred entry, and at the discretion of the Secretary of State.62 This prohibition of 
entry would be effective immediately, but would end when migration patterns were deemed 
“normal” again, highlighting the subjectivity of the application of refugee law and ambiguity in 
rhetoric surrounding the law.  
It is particularly problematic when the United States does not admit refugees from 
governments it is friendly with, when the U.S. is also materially (or symbolically or politically) 
supporting the political oppression being rendered by that government. In other words, the 
United States directly causes mass migration and a population of asylum seekers, and then turns 
those refugees away. This was the case in Central America in the 1980s, where civil wars were 
taking place that made it impossible for certain groups to live there. In his article, “The Legend 
of Reagan the Peacemaker,” Rossinow writes, “…during the 1980s governments in Central 
America strongly and materially backed by Ronald Reagan killed more than three hundred 
thousand of their own people, mainly in Guatemala and El Salvador (U.S. aid to El Salvador 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61. Ronald Reagan, “Proclamation 5517: Statement on Suspension of Cuban Refugee 
Admittance,” in The Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan, Ronald Reagan Presidential 
Library, 1986. 
 
62. Ibid.  
Slauson 48 
averaged over $1 million per day for the decade of the 1980s).”63 Serious crimes were committed 
against Central Americans, including oppression, violence, and massacres; U.S. refugee policy 
did not reflect a willingness to admit asylum seekers fleeing persecution from all of these 
governments. Gonzales argues that the hypocrisy implemented by U.S. refugee admittance 
policy and perpetuated through foreign relations that encouraged mass migration to the United 
States ultimately ensured that reform would not be successful. He writes, “[Attempts at reform] 
will fail because they will not address the driving force behind mass migration from Latin 
America over the last thirty years – that is, U.S.-backed neoliberal globalization, which was 
implemented through asymmetrical relations of domination with Latin American and Caribbean 
nations particularly in the 1980s and 1990s.”64 Rhetoric justified relationships of unequal power 
and contributed to the continuation of mass immigration to the U.S., fortifying the cyclical nature 
of goals to curb that immigration.  
In an article in the New York Times from 1983 titled “Reagan says security of the U.S. is 
‘why Central America matters,’” statements Reagan made in Long Beach, California, are 
outlined and analyzed. It states, “President Reagan, using some of his sharpest language, said 
tonight that the security and safety of United States citizens were at risk in Central America.”65 
Reagan stated that the United States was giving two times the amount of economic aid to Central 
American governments than the amount of military aid it was providing them, in attempt to calm 
accusations of too much military aid. The article states, “Mr. Reagan said economic as well as 	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military aid was needed in Central America,” justifying this spending and support. Reagan stated 
that this move was critical to ensuring national security, and not simply physical security, but a 
minimization of threats to national interests. For example, United States oil trade passed through 
the Panama Canal, and the loss of that route for the passage of oil would threaten national 
interest and consequently required the maintenance of relationships with Central American 
governments who were oppressive. Reagan apparently acknowledged contradictions in U.S. 
involvement in the area: “He acknowledged what he described as the ‘sincere motives’ of critics 
who have pointed out the human rights problems of the United States’ allies in the region. But he 
said El Salvador was trying to ‘build democracy.’”66 This trope was convenient because it 
aligned the United States as a power who was promoting democracy in foreign lands that would 
suffer without such intervention and aid. It promoted the United States as a force for democracy, 
in line with the ideal of universal liberalism that would theoretically support people fleeing from 
places without democracy as well. Despite this, the trope did not necessarily address the 
consequences for people who lived in those places. The image of the U.S. as an intervening 
power was also damaging because it did not account for the contradiction in claiming to support 
democracy while not accepting certain categories of refugees on the basis of their national origin.   
Reagan’s pro-business stance on immigration left him with rhetorical contradictions he 
made in an effort to appeal to both laborers and employers, to both “legal” immigrants and 
undocumented immigrants receiving “amnesty,” to both legislators and voting constituencies. 
Goals regarding immigration control were ultimately not met during the decade of Reagan’s 
presidency, and his ambiguous, emotionally appealing rhetoric predicted and contributed to the 
way that policy failed to procure productive results for the interests of reformers and of 
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immigrants alike. Spotts writes, “The Reagan Administration did not succeed in achieving the 
single most important immigration policy goal: the reduction of the flow of illegal 
immigration… As a result, [Reagan’s] successors inherited this legacy of failure on immigration 
policy, which required the issues to be revisited again and again.”67 The “legacy of failure” 
extended to President Bill Clinton, explored in the succeeding chapter, and particularly extended 
through the continuation of rhetoric that was ineffective in producing meaningful policy reform. 
Ineffective and ambiguous rhetoric continued specifically through the handling of Haitian 
refugee policy, the stressing of bipartisanship in immigration reform, and the contradictory, 
romanticized use of the “nation of immigrants” discourse. Lack of coherent action and rhetoric 
on immigration reform and politics meant a continuation of ambiguity of language and 
fragmented experiences of immigrants as a result of ineffective legislation. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67. Spotts, “U.S. Immigration Policy on the Southwest Border,” 611.  
Slauson 51 
CHAPTER TWO: Clinton’s ‘Nation of Laws’  
 
 
We are still a nation of immigrants; we should be proud of it. We should honor every legal 
immigrant here, working hard to be a good citizen, working hard to become a new citizen. But 
we are also a nation of laws. 
– Bill Clinton, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,” 
January 23, 1996 1 
 
If a response to increased levels of undocumented immigration urged the proactive and 
prominent immigration rhetoric and policy of the 1980s, a rise in public anti-immigrant 
sentiment urged immigration rhetoric and policy of the 1990s. Through his public statements on 
the topic of immigration, President Bill Clinton responded attentively to that characterization. 
Though not necessarily known for his speeches in the same elaborate and histrionic way that 
Reagan was, Clinton had the capacity to hold a captive audience with his language in a direct 
way, and that included his statements on immigration. James Fallows argues that Clinton’s 
speeches were successful because he addressed the audience “as if they are smart” and used 
sophisticated political arguments in his rhetoric that made audiences feel as though they had 
insight into his decisions. Fallows, who was President Carter’s speechwriter, explains, “He is 
showing that he understands the many layers of logic and evidence and positioning and emotion 
that go into political discussion – and, more important, he takes for granted that listeners can 
too.”2 Fallows argues that Clinton’s rhetoric was similar in style to sports talk radio, and that he 
“reminds us of the value (and rarity) of this tone in politics.” Further, Fallows claims “it’s the 
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difference between clarifying, and over-simplifying.”3 Clinton “clarified” so that his audiences 
felt as though they were part of the political conversation. Clinton’s clarifications helped him 
contribute to repeated discourses surrounding immigration through his use of language, and the 
continuation of these discourses that gave the general public a framework through which to 
understand issues of immigration aided in the success of Clinton’s rhetorical strategy. The 
discourses Clinton employed through his rhetoric included the “nation of immigrants” discourse, 
which he used as a qualifier to accompany stricter language, economic discourses about “limited 
resources” in the “land of opportunity,” and discourses surrounding legality, illegality, and 
criminality of the immigrant population.  
The beginning of this chapter initiates a discussion of Clinton’s immigration agenda 
during his first candidacy and upon entering office, to show the shift in his attention to 
immigration as a political issue and the way he used language to broadcast his altered attention. 
His adoption of a stricter immigration stance became clear as he handled the Haitian refugee 
crisis and the rise of anti-immigration sentiments in the United States between 1994 and 1996. 
The passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) created larger flows of 
commodities across the border, and this flow included immigrants. Clinton’s rhetoric about the 
U.S.-Mexico border emphasized his strict stance on the importance of adherence to immigration 
legislation and tough border enforcement. While his stance reflected a border that was doing 
more than it actually was to deter undocumented immigration and the image of the border 
contributed to the passage of restrictive immigration reform (The Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act), Clinton’s ability to combine his rhetoric with allusions to the 
“nation of immigrants” discourse prevailed in keeping and attracting loyal immigrant voting 
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constituencies in the 1996 presidential election. I argue that Clinton’s immigration rhetoric was 
frequently ambivalent, ambiguous, and contradictory, but that he appealed to multiple 
constituencies through allusions to common frameworks, like “the nation of immigrants” and 
discourses of “legality,” and was consequently able to avoid serious alienation of one group or 
another through his rhetoric. The ambiguity and contradiction in Clinton’s rhetoric came from its 
content, not necessarily its delivery, and was consequently unproductive in terms of passing 
meaningful legislation with positive effects for immigrants.  
At the beginning of his presidency, Clinton had limited interest in immigration as a high-
priority agenda item. Despite a General Accounting Office (GAO) report suggesting that the 
number of immigrants in the United States increased at an average rate of 275,000 people per 
year between October 1992 and October 1996, Clinton’s attention to immigration was relatively 
low as he entered office.4 Increasing recommendations from experts, political pressure, and 
public sentiment all contributed to Clinton’s shifted interest in “tackling” immigration as a high 
priority. The 1990 Immigration Act initiated the Commission on Immigration Reform, a 
commission led by Barbara Jordan (D-TX), and through the efforts of various opposing camps 
within the Jordan Commission, a report was released. Clinton’s initial stance on immigration was 
informed by the report, as well as by political and public pressure to act on immigration. Daniel 
Tichenor writes, “Anxious not to be outflanked on the immigration issue in California and other 
states by its partisan and institutional rivals, the Clinton administration praised the nation’s 
immigrant tradition while endorsing the recommendations of the Jordan Commission.”5 
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Domestic pressure from states where immigration was becoming a widely recognized “problem” 
encouraged Clinton to become actively engaged in reform, legislation, and producing an image 
of stricter enforcement. Further, attention to the “nation of immigrants” discourse provided 
Clinton with a way to appeal to both liberal and conservative constituencies, as well as 
immigrant groups, as he embraced a stance on immigration and immigration reform legislation.  
Although immigration was not a high priority for Clinton upon entering office, pressure 
to act on the “issue” soon led him to take a stance. Likewise, it was politically appealing for 
Clinton to adopt stricter immigration policy as a tactic to ensure approval from a wider political 
constituency, including cross-party approval. His rhetoric reflects this effort. Tichenor speaks 
broadly about the strategic politics of stances on immigration as he writes, “As was the case in 
the 1980s, neither Republican nor Democratic leaders wanted to appear lax in their response to 
unpopular illegal immigration; the failure of IRCA to address the problem only served to 
intensify ‘blame-avoidance’ strategies in an era of divided government.”6 The fact that amnesty 
provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 did not serve to curb 
future undocumented or documented immigration to the United States, and the failure of IRCA’s 
employer sanctions to decrease exploitation and the hiring of undocumented immigrants led to 
serious criticism of the legislation and public discontent on the topic of immigration. The low 
morale on the basis of the supposed failure of IRCA meant that it was crucial for political leaders 
looking for large levels of approval (particularly political leaders with a large stake in having a 
wide constituency of support for leverage and reelection, like the President of the United States) 
to adopt stricter political stances on immigration. Clinton was not exempt from this pressure. 
Peter Andreas, who writes extensively on the U.S.-Mexico border, explains that “…Clinton soon 	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became an enthusiastic proponent of stricter enforcement in order to stay ahead of Republican 
initiatives in Congress.”7 Andreas specifically discusses how Clinton adopted a strict stance on 
border enforcement, arguing that though it was a low priority at the beginning of his presidency, 
the tough stance led to a particularly ineffective strategy for the desired result of decreasing 
undocumented immigration into the United States.  
Maintenance of a strict stance on immigration legislation and border enforcement in order 
to appeal to Republican constituencies meant that Clinton had to qualify his tough rhetoric with 
appeals to the “nation of immigrants” discourse. Maintenance of this discourse through rhetoric 
about the importance of diversity was an important strategy to avoid alienating immigrants as 
well as the public and politicians who did not agree with restrictionist ideals.8 The “nation of 
immigrants” discourse is the continuation of the idea that the United States is founded on 
diversity and everyone in the United States comes from somewhere else. Examples of Clinton’s 
allusions to the “nation of immigrants” are present throughout his public statements about 
immigration and must be discussed in conjunction with his initial stance for a better 
understanding of the way he rhetorically shifted his language over the course of his presidency 
but maintained adherence to this discourse.  
In remarks made to the National Association of Hispanic Relations in 1996 (well into his 
time as president and well into the enactment of stricter enforcement), Clinton discussed the 
strengths of the Hispanic community in the United States, and his desire to enforce legislation 
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that prohibits exploitation in the workplace. He said, “And those of you who believe in 
immigration, who believe we are a nation of immigrants, I ask you to help me do that, so that we 
can preserve the support of the United States for a good, strong, legal immigration system that 
continues to bring us together across our diverse cultures.”9 Speaking specifically to a Hispanic 
constituency and appealing to their interests informed Clinton’s rhetoric, especially through the 
acknowledgment that the U.S. was currently a “nation of immigrants,” rather than placing the 
“nation of immigrants” in the historic past as a description that was no longer relevant but that 
once shaped the country. In an address to a similarly vested interest group, Clinton spoke in San 
Diego, though he made his remarks at the police department headquarters, which likely gave his 
statements a bent toward discourses of legality and illegality. He stated:  
Even as we crack down on illegal immigration and do more than has ever been done 
before on that, we must never forget that we are all a nation of immigrants and, except for 
Native Americans, we all came from somewhere else. I say this to make this point: Our 
incredible diversity is a source of our rich potential as we move into this global society. 
Anybody who is willing to work hard, obey the law, respect their neighbors, and follow 
the values inherent in the Constitution ought to have a chance in America, and that ought 
to be the rule here.10  
Clinton paired allusion to the “nation of immigrants” and the diversity within the United States 
with rhetoric about adherence to the law and a certain social obligation that makes diversity and 
immigration a source of strength so long as immigration has been completed “legally.” It is 
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interesting that Clinton acknowledged the shortcomings of the “nation of immigrants” discourse 
in reference to Native Americans. His acknowledgment of the indigenous population gave his 
allusion to the “nation of immigrants” greater weight, because it took into account a more current 
line of academic understanding.  
Clinton continued to pair the “nation of immigrants” discourse with “legal” and “illegal” 
discourse in his remarks in San Diego as he responded to a string of church burnings that were 
taking place at this time: “We need to come together as one America to rebuild our churches, 
restore hope, and show the forces of hatred they cannot win, just as we need to come together as 
one America to say we are a nation of immigrants and we’re a nation of laws. If you want to 
be in our country, you should be here lawfully. We will protect our people. We will enforce 
laws.”11 Clinton emphasized his “nation of immigrants and nation of laws” trope in his State of 
the Union address in January 1996 as he stated, “And tonight I announce I will sign an Executive 
order to deny Federal contracts to businesses that hire illegal immigrants. Let me be very clear 
about this: We are still a nation of immigrants; we should be proud of it. We should honor every 
legal immigrant here, working hard to be a good citizen, working hard to become a new citizen. 
But we are also a nation of laws.”12 Clinton’s rhetorical pairing of these two discourses appealed 
to multiple constituencies but ultimately the combination of qualifying statements whenever he 
spoke about immigration might not have had the effect he intended. Contradiction exists between 
“legal” discourses and the “nation of immigrants” discourse, because immigration legislation 
during Clinton’s presidency was often highly restrictive toward immigrants and pairing these 
ideas proved ironic and removed from actual experience. 	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As growing attention was paid to immigration as a political issue coming off of the 
alleged failure to implement successful immigration policy in the 1980s, Clinton adjusted his 
attention to immigration as a political tool in order to appeal to legislators and a growing interest 
from the public. Clinton veered from an unengaged standpoint, and adopted a strict stance on 
immigration in order to appeal to Republicans and anti-immigration sentiment from the public. 
He invoked contradicting discourses through his rhetoric, alluding to the United States as a 
“nation of immigrants” in conjunction with allusions to the country as a “nation of laws.” His 
contribution to both of these discourses simultaneously helped him appeal to multiple 
constituencies by noting the positive diversity that comes from immigration, and it allowed him 
to, at the same time, take a strict, firm position on the necessity of tough enforcement. Clinton’s 
first test in terms of handling large-scale migration to the United States was the Haitian “refugee 
crisis,” which was an ongoing phenomenon throughout his campaign and early years of his 
presidency.  
Following the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, many refugees from Haiti and Cuba fled 
to the United States to seek asylum from oppressive political regimes. The 1980 Refugee Act 
adopted the United Nations’ protocol in terms of refugee admittance, and broadened the 
definition of a refugee in the United States to include those fleeing violence, rooted fear of future 
violence, and political oppression on the basis of political ideology, religion, and group 
membership. Tough stances made by administrations on refugee admittance have prospectively 
been the result of attempts to counter the way that President Carter was seen as maintaining too 
liberal a policy on refugee admittance, as he gave temporary legal status to Haitian and Cuban 
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refugees, with the option for Cubans to become lawfully permanent residents.13 This exodus was 
called the Mariel Boatlift, because Cubans and Haitians came to the U.S. by boat. Haitians were 
initially fleeing the Duvalier regime, but this regime was seen as an ally to the United States 
during the Cold War. It was difficult for Haitians to gain political asylum because historically the 
U.S. does not grant political asylum to people seeking asylum from governments that are friendly 
to the United States, regardless of whether that government is an evidenced repressive regime. 
The U.S. also has a history of “making political asylum much easier to obtain for petitioners 
from governments at odds with the United States.”14 Prior to Clinton’s presidency, President 
Bush attempted to help restore democracy to the government in Haiti in an effort to deter 
migration to the U.S. Aristide was elected in Haiti, but a coup several months later by military 
leaders reversed this effort and political violence continued. Two key policies were implemented 
at this point. First, people attempting to flee Haiti could apply for asylum to seek refuge in the 
U.S. in an office in Port-au-Prince before leaving Haiti. Out-of-country asylum applications were 
seen as a method to curb the number of refugees who would actually make the journey to the 
United States. Out-of-country applications were dangerous and ineffective, because the 
application office was in a public venue and intimidation and violence made it difficult for 
people to complete applications or even make appointments at this office. In May of 1992, Bush 
ordered a direct-return policy, where refugees picked up at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard were 
sent back to Haiti without a chance to apply for asylum and without any temporary protections. 
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Here, Bush employed the rhetoric of the “political” refugee versus the “economic” refugee, and 
this distinction of rhetoric continued into Clinton’s repertoire.  
During his candidacy for president, Clinton spoke out against Bush senior’s policy to 
send refugees back to Haiti without first granting them temporary asylum, unless there was 
compelling evidence to suggest that they were not political refugees. When the case went to the 
Supreme Court in 1993, however, the Clinton White House argued in favor of continuing the 
“forced repatriation” of Haitian refugees.15 While officially favoring the policy, Clinton 
attempted to differentiate his stance on the Haitian “refugee crisis” from Bush’s unpopular and 
strict stance. He argued that the policies of forced repatriation and out of country asylum 
application in Port-au-Prince were only temporary. Bostdorff writes on the presidential rhetoric 
surrounding the Haitian refugee crisis, and in her work on Haitian refugees and rhetoric, she 
explains that “while the president’s actions offended many individuals, including members of his 
own party, the fact was that Clinton had more to gain than to lose by adopting policies that 
stopped Haitian immigration – a point he seemed to recognize.”16 By adopting policies that 
would curb the number of Haitian refugees seeking asylum in the United States, Clinton 
appealed to the interests of a number of constituencies. Bostdorff writes:  
Clinton’s repeated reference in his public rhetoric to a possible exodus of Haitian 
refugees was, no doubt, a persuasive line of argument in the anti-immigrant climate of the 
United States at the time… At the same time, Clinton’s rhetoric on Haiti had begun to 
refer more often to the brutality of the military regime, which led to expectations that he 
might change his policy on Haitian refugees… Much like President Bush before him, 
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Clinton attempted to deflect criticism of the direct return policy by focusing attention on 
U.S. humanitarian efforts.17 
Growing anti-immigrant public sentiment in the United States allowed Clinton to adopt rhetoric 
that supported the continuation of policies that prohibited the admittance of refugees to the 
country. He simultaneously appealed to the constituency of people living in the United States 
who were opposed to high levels of immigration to the country. His consideration to the ruling 
regime in Haiti and how the U.S. was working on bringing democracy back to the country not 
only deflected attention from the fact that the U.S. was also actively sending Haitians back to an 
oppressive regime, but also emphasized the trope that the United States is the ultimate benefactor 
of democracy in countries that need humane rescuing from corrupt governments. 
The situation had escalated and there was open public opposition to the way that Clinton 
was handling the Haitian refugee crisis by early 1994. Aristide, leading Haiti from exile, 
compared the Clinton administration’s actions to turning away Jews fleeing the Nazis. Bostdorff 
writes, “for his part, President Clinton seemed stunned by all the criticism and, in a passing 
conversation with newspaper columnists, almost seemed to agree with his critics.”18  His rhetoric 
in response to his critics drew attention to the military junta’s violence against “ordinary 
Haitians,” which he used as validation in discussions of potential U.S. military force being used 
to restore Aristide’s leadership. Eventually, in response to intelligence reports and surely to 
domestic pressures, Clinton made slight adjustments to the forced repatriation policy: Haitians 
who were intercepted at sea were questioned and those who were clearly and distinctly political 
refugees would be taken to the U.S. or to other countries, while those whose refugee status was 
indiscernible were still sent back to Haiti. This adjustment to Bush’s policy lessened criticism, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17. Ibid., 226.  
 
18. Ibid., 228.  
Slauson 62 
but Clinton was still appealing to anti-immigration public sentiment in his discussion of policies 
that would stop refugees from coming to the U.S. and incurring costs on the country. The 
influence of domestic pressure on Clinton’s policy decisions and accompanying rhetoric was 
strong. First, he continued strict policies for refugee admittance in response to public sentiment 
in regards to President Carter’s liberal approach to refugee admittance. He appeased anti-
immigrant sentiments to continue Bush senior’s forced repatriation, shifted to a less restrictionist 
version of this direct-return policy in response to pressure from within and from outside his own 
party, and invoked fears about new immigrants to the United States, on the basis of public anti-
immigration sentiment, in order to validate U.S. intervention policy that would alleviate political 
repression in Haiti and consequently curb the flow of refugees to the United States.  
Another key aspect of Clinton’s rhetorical strategy throughout the development of events 
in Haiti was the revival of Bush’s economic versus political refugee rhetoric in order to defend 
himself against renewals of opposition that said his shifts in policy did not do enough. In retort to 
this opposition, Clinton claimed that ordinary Haitians were economic refugees, therefore not 
requiring the urgency associated with seeking political asylum.19 Clinton’s defense is in direct 
contrast with his statements about the severe violence (including murder, rape, kidnapping, and 
maiming) that was happening to “ordinary Haitians” at the hands of the military junta and would 
quite obviously qualify them for political asylum in the United States under the terms of the 1980 
Refugee Act. Bostdorff describes Clinton’s consistently ambivalent rhetoric as “…rhetorical 
gymnastics that denied the viability of most Haitians’ arguments for political asylum.”20 There is 
serious irony, inconsistency, and hypocrisy in Clinton’s argument about instilling democracy in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19. Ibid., 232.  
 
20. Ibid., 236.  
Slauson 63 
Haiti and sending U.S. military force to fight the military junta as a means of preventing Haitians 
from fleeing Haiti and flooding the United States, because he argued for the distinction of 
Haitian refugees as “economic” rather than “political” for such a long period of time in order to 
lessen their qualifications for entry into the United States.  
The Haitian refugee crisis came to an end when a multinational force led by the United 
States began to invade Haiti on September 19, 1994, on the basis of the argument for instilling 
democracy. Last minute diplomacy stopped this invasion from following through, and the 
Haitian military agreed to step down, allowed the deployed forces to land peacefully, and 
restored Aristide to presidency.21 Clinton’s rhetoric throughout the crisis was strongly influenced 
by domestic pressures and public sentiment. He showed inconsistency in the dichotomous 
language of “economic refugee” versus “political refugee” and in his insistence that ordinary 
Haitians were being persecuted by the military regime and consequently the U.S. was 
responsible to either a) intervene with force or b) to encourage a policy that would make political 
repression less feasible in Haiti. Further, the use of the image as the United States as a “rescuer” 
to a non-democratically governed people was harmful because direct-return policy was not 
reflective of an actual humanitarian-inspired refugee admittance guideline. Because of Clinton’s 
consideration of public sentiment in his decisions throughout the Haitian refugee crisis, it is 
necessary to delve into factors that contributed to anti-immigration sentiments in the United 
States during his presidency.  
Anti-immigration sentiments grew between 1994 and 1996 specifically, and played a 
critical role in Clinton’s immigration rhetoric. Several events contributed to the rise of anti-
immigration sentiments during this period. IRCA and its supposed failures to deter 
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undocumented immigration to the United States arguably set the stage for a backlash against 
immigration in the 1990s.22 The 1994 bombing of the World Trade Center negatively impacted 
public opinion on immigration admittances by instilling a fear of immigrants and “foreigners” as 
threats to national security. Tichenor writes, “Popular support for restricting immigration also 
seemed to intensify across the country by 1994.”23 Congressional shifts contributed to the rise in 
anti-immigration sentiment and created a setting for restrictionist reform to flourish. The House 
and Senate became majority Republican in 1994 and there were a growing number of committee 
chairs who favored restricting immigrant admissions and restricting immigrant rights. The 
Commission on Immigration Reform proposed increased border security, cutting overall legal 
immigration, implementation of a national employment verification system, and a shift in legal 
immigration legislation away from family-based to employment and skills based preferences. 
Aggressive lobbying by business and minority special interest groups brought this Congress to 
middle ground and restrictionist provisions were removed by the time IIRIRA was passed in 
1996.24 
A poignant reflection of anti-immigration sentiment at this time was a ballot measure 
proposed in California in 1994 called Proposition 187. It would prohibit undocumented 
immigrants from receiving healthcare, public education, and other social services. The measure 
was written by a group in Orange County who wrote to Congressional representatives and 
grassroots organizations with anti-immigration leanings for support, and eventually the 
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proposition was pushed to the ballot in 1994. Republican Governor Wilson supported Prop 187 
and it passed by 59%.25 Proposition 187 was later appealed and found unconstitutional by a 
federal court. Clinton discusses legal immigration and exploitation in the workplace in terms of 
Prop 187 in his remarks to the National Association of Hispanic Publications in 1996:  
Let me just say one other thing about security. I think if we’re going to have security we 
have to have very firm, firm laws that protect the workplace in America. Federico said I 
opposed Proposition 187; I did. I thought it was a bad policy. I didn’t want to see children 
thrown out of schools, sick people thrown out of hospitals. But I do not believe that 
people who are not here legally should be in the workplace, and a lot of them are being 
exploited today, exploited in unconscionable ways because we do not enforce laws that 
are on the books for legal immigration.26 
Speaking directly to a Hispanic constituency, Clinton framed security as a protective measure for 
immigrants that would deter exploitative practices in the workplace. He simultaneously made it 
clear that he maintained a firm stance on undocumented immigration. He was able to denounce 
any indication that he might have approved of Prop 187, while his rhetoric contributed to a 
legally driven discourse. Clinton’s attention to immigration in the workplace, such as comments 
about exploitative actions towards immigrants by employers, should be considered in 
conjunction with the passage of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, as 
it opened the economy to transnational operations despite the rise in anti-immigration sentiment 
so apparent in other arenas.  
NAFTA was passed on January 1, 1994, and created an economic free trade zone 
between Canada, the United States, and Mexico. It encourages movement of information, capital, 
and people across the border, which led to the growth of social networks and fueled immigration 
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in the short and medium term, though Andreas argues that there was not certain evidence that 
NAFTA would contribute positively to the separate but ultimately related goal of deterring 
immigration in the long term.27 Andreas explains the considerations of border security within 
negotiations on NAFTA further as he writes, “Concern that smugglers might benefit from 
NAFTA was deliberately not discussed during the negotiations over the free-trade accord in the 
early 1990s.”28 Andreas argues that the open economic border that NAFTA initiated led to 
increases in smuggling of both narcotics and people across the U.S.-Mexico border. Imports 
from Mexico to the United States have doubled since NAFTA was passed in 1994, and Andreas 
writes that “…the post-NAFTA boom in commercial flows simultaneously drew more political 
attention to the border and made the task of weeding out the drug flow increasingly difficult.”29 
An example of Clinton’s rhetoric on NAFTA in his remarks to the National Association of 
Hispanic Publications in 1996 shows his motive to appeal to a Hispanic constituency while 
lacking acknowledgment of the detriments of the legislation: 
I thank the Hispanic community for the support we received for NAFTA, for the support 
we received for the summit of the Americas, for the support I received in probably the 
most controversial – perhaps one of the two or three most controversial decisions of my 
administration, to try and reach out and give some support to the reformers in Mexico to 
keep the economy from collapse so that we could continue to be good partners and good 
friends.30 
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Despite reparations of relations over the economy that Clinton acknowledges, the flow of traffic 
that NAFTA caused also helped induce greater levels of smuggling of narcotics and immigrants 
across the U.S.-Mexico border and altered the Mexican economy such that employment 
opportunities in the country shifted and more people were encouraged to migrate. The lack of 
acknowledgment of NAFTA’s shortcomings as they specifically harm the Hispanic community 
is pointed as he speaks to this audience. Andreas argues that the opening of the transnational 
economy led to tension at the site of the border, as security along the border simultaneously 
tightened in terms of immigration. The tightening of the border became one of the largest aspects 
of Clinton’s immigration control agenda.   
Clinton’s attention to the tightening of the border as a particular site that was responsible 
for undocumented immigration allowed him to shift his stance to one of strict engagement with 
immigration as a political issue as the image of the border as a tool for immigration control grew. 
Clinton’s engagement with immigration as a political issue came largely from his attention to the 
U.S.-Mexico border, but his attention was not always evident. Spotts explains, “In early 1993, 
[Clinton] even recommended reducing the number of Border Patrol agents in order to save 
money.”31 Domestic pressure encouraged Clinton to develop a stance on immigration and more 
specifically on the border. Andreas explains that the “build-up of policing along the border 
quickly emerged as the centerpiece of the Administration’s immigration control policy.”32  
Specific strategies that the INS imposed to increase enforcement of the Border Patrol 
were inspired by strategies first tested in El Paso, Texas in September of 1993. Operation “Hold 
the Line” in El Paso was developed by Silvestre Reyes, and inspired Operation Gatekeeper in 	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San Diego, CA, Operation Safeguard in Nogales, AZ, and Operation Rio Grande, implemented 
along its namesake.33 In his opening statement in El Paso in 1996, Clinton thanked Reyes for his 
career in the INS. He said, “Thank you for proving that America can protect its borders and still 
be an honorable nation of immigrants.”34 In his expression of gratitude, Clinton combined 
rhetoric about border protection with a contribution to the “nation of immigrants” discourse. The 
combination appealed to his audience while it expressed his approval of heightened border 
security measures. The military was also involved in increases in border enforcement. Military 
officers cannot make arrests of undocumented immigrants, but they helped with night scopes, 
provided motion sensors, communications equipment, and aided in building and maintaining 
roads and fences. Military equipment was adapted for use by Border Patrol agents.35 Significant 
funding was redirected to border control, and Clinton boasted in 1997 that over the course of the 
border enforcement plan, “INS funding has grown 105 percent.”36 Methods inspired by the 
military may have deterred migrants from crossing the border at high-security locations, but this 
meant that they adjusted to find increasingly dangerous methods of entry. Dangerous alternate 
routes through the desert led immigrants to experience exposure, dehydration, automobile 
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accidents, and drowning. An increase in fraudulent documents as a means of entry was another 
result of heightened enforcement in specific locations along the border.  
The image of increased enforcement seemed to matter more to policy-makers than the 
resulting experiences and strategies of immigrants attempting to enter the United States. Andreas 
argues that “the unprecedented expansion of border policing… has ultimately been less about 
achieving the stated instrumental goal of deterring illegal border crossers and more about 
politically recrafting the image of the border and symbolically reaffirming the state’s territorial 
authority.”37 Evidence shows that the implemented strategies did not contribute to any overall 
decrease in undocumented immigration into the United States, despite the perceived usefulness 
of the border as maintaining the image of a site of strict enforcement and control. Operation 
Gatekeeper led to a 40% increase in fraudulent document use, and “…neglect of visa overstays is 
itself a revealing indicator of how the symbolic importance of border control trumps the stated 
policy goal of reducing the size of the illegal immigrant population.”38 Further, apprehensions 
and entries both increased by the end of Clinton’s presidency, which meant that even as Border 
Patrol agents made more arrests, the apprehension statistic that contributed to the image of a 
tightly controlled border did not acknowledge the ways in which it failed to achieve its stated 
goals.39 Andreas explains that successful border enforcement initiatives procured for law 
enforcement agencies, elected leaders, and smugglers meant “a failing deterrence strategy, 
however, [could] still be a political success.”40 The border appears orderly and under control, 
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while unauthorized crossings are more discrete and out of public view. Being out of public view 
also means that unauthorized crossings are more dangerous for immigrants. Andreas also argues 
that border controls “relegitimize the boundaries of the ‘imagined community,’” which is an 
effective tool for controlling precisely who is allowed admission to the United States and who 
should be allowed admission. Rhetoric surrounding tight border control measures distinguishes 
who can be a member of the ‘imagined community’ of the United States.  
Clinton’s rhetoric surrounding enforcement at the U.S.-Mexico border reflected his 
adoption of a strict stance on immigration. In a statement on senate action on immigration he 
stated: 
Over the last 3 years, I have directed my administration to use every tool at its disposal to 
crack down on illegal immigration and to reintroduce the rule of law at the border and in 
the workplace. We have made illegal crossings at the Southwest border tougher than ever 
before by increasing manpower by 50 percent and employing state-of-the-art technology. 
We are deporting record numbers of criminal and other illegal aliens from the United 
States, and we have put teeth into our immigration laws in the workplace.41 
Clinton references numbers of deportations as well as enforcement technology in order to 
maintain the image of the border as successful at deterring undocumented immigrants from 
crossing into the United States. His mention of enforcing the “rule of law” at the border as well 
as in the workplace indicates that these are both spaces that need policing, though most images 
associated with immigration control are primarily found at the border. The border certainly 
produces a more dramatic image for the public. In remarks from police headquarters in San 
Diego (distinct because of its status as a city near the U.S.-Mexico border), Clinton discussed 	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special efforts made in border communities to lower the crime rate, and contended that his 
administration followed through on its promises to implement controls on immigration.  He 
stated: “But think how far we have come in the last 3 ½ years. Three and a half years ago, many 
people believed that these problems were totally intractable, that drugs would always flow freely, 
that illegal immigration would always be rampant, that criminal immigrants deported for crimes 
they committed here in America would return the very next day to commit crimes again.”42 
Statements about criminality in Clinton’s rhetoric justified the use of extreme and military-
inspired enforcement technology, increased spending in border communities, and increased 
deportations. In the same remarks, he stated: 
The crime bill gave us the weapons we need to do things that had not been done before to 
deal with the problems of criminal activities by illegal immigrants. As of January of last 
year, we have arrested more than 1,700 criminal aliens and prosecuted them on Federal 
felony charges because they returned to America after having been deported in the first 
place. We are changing the policy of this country on that problem. We are also making 
strides in getting control of our border. We’ve added Border Patrol agents, in San Diego 
alone increasing by 762 the number of agents who are working for you by the end of this 
year. In El Paso, our border guards stand so close together, they can actually all see each 
other. [Laughter].43 
Clinton used the same techniques throughout these remarks to criminalize immigrants while he 
discussed additions to Border Patrol that would lead to successful apprehensions. He made light 
of the militarization of the border with his statement at the end of this passage that border guards 
in El Paso are so numerous that they can all see each other as they stand along the border, and 
this not only had the potential to alienate immigrants (documented and undocumented) but also 
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implied that the border was so tight that it could not possibly fail to eliminate undocumented 
immigration (which was not the case). In regard to the Clinton administration’s public 
association with the border, Andreas writes:  
Almost every indicator that Administration officials point to as a sign of success can also 
be read as a sign of failure, and almost every indicator that points to failure is either 
downplayed or interpreted by Administration officials as a sign of success. The 
ambiguity of the measures, combined with the heated political climate over immigration 
control, means that appearances matter enormously.44 
The importance of appearance and signs of success are clear in Clinton’s rhetoric about the 
border and increases in enforcement. Clinton responded to domestic pressures through tightening 
border security and his rhetoric stresses the image of a border that is successful in deterring 
undocumented immigration. His “tough” stance on the border meant a “tough” stance on 
immigration as well, which was an appealing place for Clinton to be in terms of reelection and 
cross-party alliances. The strategies implemented along the border were useful for the image of 
the border as a site for immigration control, but were not necessarily producing the desired result 
of their enactment.  
The border played a crucial role in Clinton’s 1996 reelection, however misleading his 
rhetoric may have been. Andreas writes, “In the 1996 presidential race, beefed-up border 
controls provided Clinton with a powerful political shield against Republican attack, especially 
in the politically vital state of California.”45 Clinton took California in the election, and more 
significantly, he took Orange County, which is typically a Republican county.46 Andreas 
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discusses the border as a campaign tool more broadly as he writes, “For elected leaders, the 
campaign [for stricter border enforcement] has won votes and provided a politically costless 
method of signaling that they are ‘tough’ on illegal immigration.”47 Clinton’s rhetoric proved a 
convincing campaign strategy. Immigrants were used in the 1996 election campaigns in ads, 
images, and rhetoric. The DNC and Clinton paired to produce images of detained and 
apprehended immigrants, signaling Clinton’s efficiency to control immigration at the border. To 
counter this, the RNC released an ad about increased spending on “illegals” with lower wages 
going to “typical” and documented workers.48 There is irony in using undocumented immigrants 
and images of people waiting to be deported in a campaign for the presidency of a country from 
which those people are being excluded, but that is somewhat tangential. Clinton’s rhetoric during 
his 1996 campaign for reelection highlighted strict border enforcement and this proved his 
“tough” stance on immigration control to voters from both major political parties. The 
maintenance of a crafted image of the border was helpful for Clinton during the 1996 election 
and it was reflected in immigration legislation and reform passed during Clinton’s presidency.  
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) passed 
easily in both houses in 1996, and the final version enhanced national border guarding, tightened 
asylum procedures, limited public benefits and access to resources for immigrants, required U.S. 
financial sponsors for immigrants, and included provisions for “criminal” and undocumented 
immigrants.49 Specifically, it authorized hiring 1,000 new Border Patrol agents per year with the 
goal to have a total force population of 10,000 agents by the year 2001; it increased penalties and 	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doubled sentences, implementing “mandatory minimum sentencing for those convicted of 
smuggling aliens for commercial gain;” increased and reinforced fourteen miles of fencing; and 
was written on the premise of a “prevention through deterrence” strategy.50 Restrictionists 
believed that it appealed too much to special interests, even though it was certainly not an 
expansive bill in terms of admissions or immigrant rights.51 The Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act of 1996 was also signed into legislation, and barred noncitizens from 
various welfare benefits.52 Fragomen explains that Congress concluded that cutting public 
benefits for immigrants would deter undocumented immigration.53 The introduction of policy 
that made it more difficult for immigrants to make a living in the United States aligned with the 
“prevention through deterrence” strategy implemented in IIRIRA. Tichenor writes, “President 
Clinton told the press that he was offended by the legislation’s harshness toward legal 
immigrants, but that he chose to sign the reform package because of his devotion to 
fundamentally restructure the larger welfare system.”54 Despite Clinton’s hope that after he 
signed this legislation it would lead to a more widespread and lasting welfare system reform, 
Fragomen is not as optimistic about the changes that this legislation implemented nor is he 
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enthusiastic about the fact that Clinton signed the omnibus spending bill for the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 that incorporated IIRIRA. He writes: 
Together, these bills completely overhaul a welfare system that has been in place since 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal was implemented. They not only end the 
guarantee of cash assistance to the country’s poorest children and give states the power to 
run their own welfare and ‘workfare’ programs with lump sums of federal funds, they 
severely restrict the benefits for which legal, and illegal, immigrants are currently 
eligible.55 
Fragomen claims that these bills change the immigration system in a negative way, countering 
Clinton’s argument that they were worth the price paid by immigrants. Restrictions of benefits to 
immigrants as well as increased penalties for smuggling introduced as a result of the 
authorization of spending on these bills led to more organized means of smuggling and 
consequent additional increases in tough legislation, while immigrants were unable to access 
welfare benefits that could increase their quality of life in the United States. Clinton was fully 
aware of the compromise he was making in signing this legislation. He stated:  
I am pleased that the Senate has endorsed our strategy with legislation that answers my 
administration’s call for tougher penalties for alien smugglers, criminal aliens, and 
manufacturers and sellers of fraudulent documents. The Senate bill also supports our plan 
to continue to increase the size of our Border Patrol and provides the Justice Department 
with new tools to fight illegal immigration. While this bill strongly supports our 
enforcement efforts, it still goes too far in denying legal immigrants access to vital safety 
net programs which could jeopardize public health and safety. Some work still needs to 
be done. I urge the Congress to move quickly to finalize and send me this key 
legislation.56  
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Perhaps because Clinton’s statement was made on Senate action on immigration legislation (and 
not a direct appeal to public sentiment) he was more frank in his concerns about denying welfare 
benefits to immigrants, though his continued reference to increasing border enforcement, and the 
positive effects of doing so, maintained that “tough” stance. Despite the adoption of stricter 
legislation through the passage of spending on these bills, a silver lining became clear mid-way 
through Clinton’s presidency until its close through the increase of political participation of 
different generations of immigrants (1st, 2nd, and 3rd generations, for example), specifically 
Hispanic Americans, in the United States.  
Large numbers of naturalizations happened throughout the 1990s as a result of 
applications for IRCA and applications of beneficiaries of immigrants who were given legal 
status under IRCA, the growth of social networks of immigrants in the United States, and 
initiatives to increase naturalizations and maintain a positive image of the INS. Citizenship USA 
was an initiative announced in August of 1995 intended to reduce the major backlog of 
naturalization applications handled by the INS. An increase in the number of completed 
naturalization cases was crucial for this initiative to be effective.57 Tichenor writes optimistically 
about this increase and consequent rise in political participation of naturalized immigrants. He 
writes:  
The 1996 election left little doubt about two crucial facts: immigrants comprised the 
nation’s fastest growing voting bloc and Democrats were the immediate beneficiaries of 
their unexpected electoral clout… At the same time that unprecedented numbers of aliens 
petitioned for naturalization in the wake of mid-1990s restrictions on public benefits for 
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noncitizens, President Clinton instructed the INS to implement the so-called Citizenship 
USA initiative of 1995.58  
The initiative streamlined naturalizations and the increase in numbers of naturalized immigrants 
was ideal for Clinton and other Democratic Party members seeking reelection. More Latino 
voters, specifically, showed up to polls and voted specifically for Democrats, because they were 
angered by restrictionist propositions that were written and supported largely by right-wing 
individuals. Tichenor notes that Asian Americans also increased their political support for 
Democrats.59 Tichenor continues, “…Proposition 187, IIRIRA, and welfare reform motivated 
record numbers of new immigrants and kindred ethnics to make the most of their naturalization 
opportunities and voting rights.”60 Democrats specifically benefited from motivated voters. In 
the 1996 presidential election and the 1997 LA city elections, Latino voter turnout percentages 
exceeded non-Latino voter turnout. Clinton won 71 percent of the Latino vote in 1996, and 
immigrants are also credited with the reclamation of the California House in 1996. The Speaker 
and the floor leader in the California House were both Latino.61 Clinton and other democratic 
leaders benefited from rhetoric that appealed to this growing constituency of voters, and voters 
were deterred from electing restrictionist-identified candidates. While Clinton’s rhetoric was not 
always clear, nor lacking ambiguity and contradiction, nor free from strict and aggressive 
language, it did not blatantly alienate immigrants as a constituency of voters and this was 
important for his reelection and presidency.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58. Tichenor, Dividing Lines, 285.  
 
59. Ibid., 286. 
 
60. Ibid., 287-88.  
 
61. Ibid., 286.	  	  
Slauson 78 
 Clinton’s immigration rhetoric reflected strategic appeal to public sentiment, to 
constituencies with political power, and to his political allies. The way Clinton appealed to 
constituencies provided him with support for reelection in 1996. Characterized by a shift to a 
strict stance on immigration, language that gave the border an image of complete control, and the 
combination of language alluding to the “nation of immigrants” and simultaneous “nation of 
laws,” Clinton’s rhetoric often contradicted the real effects of border enforcement and restrictive 
legislation. Its ambiguity may have proved productive for Clinton politically and measured by 
public sentiment, but its contradictions and lack of acknowledgment of real effects meant that his 
rhetoric failed to result in productive legislation and immigration reform. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
My fellow Americans, we are and always will be a nation of immigrants. We were strangers 
once, too. And whether our forebears were strangers who crossed the Atlantic, or the Pacific, or 
the Rio Grande, we are here only because this country welcomed them in, and taught them that 
to be an American is about something more than what we look like, or what our last names are, 
or how we worship. What makes us Americans is our shared commitment to an ideal – that all of 
us are created equal, and all of us have the chance to make of our lives what we will. 
– Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Immigration,” Nov. 20, 
20141 
 
The development of presidential immigration rhetoric on the basis of President Reagan’s 
precedent shows the ease with which immigration can be spoken about in contradictory and 
unproductive ways. Language that emphasizes the “nation of immigrants,” in which diversity is 
accepted and promoted as the foundation of the U.S. as a “melting pot,” has been used to justify 
and counteract statements suggestive of restrictionist attitudes for the past three and a half 
decades. Contradictory, ambiguous, ambivalent, and abstract language employed by Reagan and 
Clinton has prohibited immigration reform from passing and functioning in productive and 
meaningful ways for immigrants in the United States, and the effect of this type of immigration 
rhetoric has persisted through the language employed by President Obama in his contributions to 
immigration discourses.  
Because there is a clear continuation of rhetoric on the precedent of Reagan’s response to 
the fourth wave of immigrants to the United States, attention to current rhetoric from Obama and 
his administration is crucial to exploring how presidential immigration rhetoric has developed. A 
brief exploration of Obama’s November 20, 2014 speech in regard to executive action on 
immigration provides insight into the development of presidential rhetoric on the topic of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Immigration,” 
The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, November 20, 2014. 
 
Slauson 80 
immigration. Following the patterns of Reagan and Clinton, Obama began his speech by alluding 
to the “nation of immigrants” before he approached his main points. Obama stated, “For more 
than 200 years, our tradition of welcoming immigrants from around the world has given us a 
tremendous advantage over other nations. It’s kept us youthful, dynamic, and entrepreneurial. It 
has shaped our character as a people with limitless possibilities – people not trapped by our past, 
but able to remake ourselves as we choose.”2 After he introduced his conversation with positive 
rhetoric about the democratic traditions of the land of opportunity, Obama diverted to the 
“comprehensive reform” discourse. He stated, “our immigration system is broken -- and 
everybody knows it.”3 Obama defended his executive order by first stressing the need for a 
“comprehensive reform” to match the national character of the United States, and this discourse 
on reform drove the remainder of his speech.  
Obama discussed how the border has been tightened during his administration and that 
there are currently more Border Patrol agents than at any other point in history. Further, he 
discussed the record-low number of border crossings during his administration, and the calming 
of the large rise in unaccompanied minors entering the U.S. He did not address that during his 
administration the U.S. has deported more immigrants than at any other point in the nation’s 
history. Yet, he argued, the broken system remained. After discussion of improvements, he 
stated, “Meanwhile, I worked with Congress on a comprehensive fix, and last year, 68 
Democrats, Republicans, and independents came together to pass a bipartisan bill in the Senate. 
It wasn’t perfect. It was a compromise. But it reflected common sense.”4 Bipartisan effort 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2. Ibid.  
 
3. Ibid.  
 
4. Ibid.  
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seemed important to Obama throughout his speech, though the unique nature of issuing an 
executive order meant that he did not need to appeal directly to Republican legislators in this 
speech.  
Obama’s executive order, he explained, called for the ability for undocumented 
immigrants to stay in the country temporarily without fear of deportation under the following 
conditions: the immigrant has been in the United States for more than five years, has children 
who are citizens or legal permanent residents, goes through the registration process for the 
temporary documented status, goes through a background check, and pays taxes. Obama 
responded to possible critics:  
I know some of the critics of this action call it amnesty. Well, it’s not. Amnesty is the 
immigration system we have today – millions of people who live here without paying 
their taxes or playing by the rules while politicians use the issue to scare people and whip 
up votes at election time. That’s the real amnesty – leaving this broken system the way it 
is. Mass amnesty would be unfair. Mass deportation would be both impossible and 
contrary to our character. What I’m describing is accountability – a common-sense, 
middle-ground approach: If you meet the criteria, you can come out of the shadows and 
get right with the law. If you’re a criminal, you’ll be deported. If you plan to enter the 
U.S. illegally, your chances of getting caught and sent back just went up.5 
Obama avoided a rhetorical grey area with the use of “accountability” to describe his order, 
rather than “amnesty.” Accountability is a more useful term, as it implies adherence to law and 
also to the “nation of immigrants.” Obama continued, anecdotally speaking about hardworking 
immigrants in the U.S.: immigrant fathers working three jobs, family members sacrificing for 
each other, and other similar examples. He rhetorically posited several questions for the 
audience, and asked whether the character of the nation should compel people living there to 
show compassion for non-criminal immigrants trying to “make it” in America.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5. Ibid.  
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 Obama acknowledged failed prior policies, and his rhetoric reflected the unique power of 
the president to enact an executive order without necessary appeals to opposing constituencies 
through rhetoric. His desire to redefine “amnesty” and explain the difficult circumstances 
immigrants face is encouraging coming from the president. Despite positive interpretations of the 
content of Obama’s address, rhetorical precedents set at the beginning of the current wave of 
immigration shape his language. The acknowledgment of the continuation of rhetorical patterns 
in public presidential discussion of immigration is important because its persistence has real 
implications for immigrant populations and the legislation that can shape their experience in the 
United States.  
 Examining presidential immigration rhetoric using a gendered lens would provide a 
crucial addition to this project. Do specific issues that are gendered determine immigration 
rhetoric? Gendered rhetoric was evident in examining how women were specifically affected by 
IRCA, but that could be expanded more fully to other presidential immigration rhetoric and that 
rhetoric’s potential to shape the experiences of women immigrants. With the potential for a 
woman to be in office with Hillary Clinton’s April 2015 campaign announcement, studying 
presidential rhetoric also has the potential for new research questions. Will a woman candidate’s 
rhetoric embody the hallmarks of the “modern” president’s rhetoric that Lim describes? Or will 
the characteristics of a “modern presidency” take on a new shape? How would this change the 
way that immigration is spoken about at an executive level, if at all?  Some research exists on the 
rhetoric of women politicians and could inform this realm of research. In a case study examining 
Hillary Clinton’s campaign rhetoric in 2008, Bligh et. al write:   
First, all of the research indicates that the office of the president is intertwined with 
notions of masculinity, and this is likely to pose significant problems for any female 
presidential candidate. Second, findings in social psychology suggest that it is difficult 
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for females in leadership positions to garner positive evaluations on the two dimensions 
(warmth and competence) identified as being essential to effective leaders. A linguistic 
style and choice of words that conveys strength and competence in a male leader may 
result in a female leader being labeled as “cold,” but a more caring/maternal style may 
signal the female leader lacks the strength necessary to handle crises.6  
 
Perceptions of women in politics, based on concepts of adequate leadership and masculinity, 
shape how those women present themselves. Because there are so few women candidates for the 
presidency from which to draw data, research on this topic, and particularly the topic of 
immigration rhetoric, is still limited. A study on a woman president’s immigration rhetoric 
would add to the body of research on presidential rhetoric, if the occasion arises in 2016. A study 
on Hillary Clinton’s campaign rhetoric and the way it might or might not contribute to 
immigration discourses would prove useful as well.   
 Patterns found through Reagan, Clinton, and a small sample of Obama’s language 
suggest that presidential immigration rhetoric has developed on the basis of Reagan’s precedent 
over the past thirty-five years and has reached a stagnant place of compromise that appeals to 
multiple constituencies while promoting American values. Rhetoric has often been contradictory, 
ambiguous, and consequently unproductive. Bipartisan efforts to pass immigration legislation are 
trapped in this compromise, and the effects of the lack of productive legislation – immigrants 
resorting to dangerous travel through deserts on the Southwest border and exploitation in the 
workplace, for example – are felt directly by immigrant communities in the United States. Until 
presidential immigration rhetoric can move away from this place of stagnancy and allusion to the 
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“melting pot,” understandings of the immigrant experience will continue to be shaped by narrow 
discourses that prohibit productive, truly comprehensive immigration system reform.  
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